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Abstract
Without a doubt, the salmon fishery in Alaska has been at the forefront of natural resource 
debates and has served as an example of ineffective, misunderstood, and controversial policies, 
as well as many missed opportunities to better understand the resource. Management of Alaska’s 
longest lasting natural resource industry is contingent upon an evolving scientific understanding 
of salmon. At the same time, policy has been shaped by political, economic, cultural, and social 
phenomena. Considering these parts of the historical narrative of the Alaska salmon industry dem­
onstrates the fundamental challenges of fisheries management: reconciling biological limitation, 
economic demands, and cultural practices. This study contextualizes modern salmon management 
in Alaska by analyzing early- to mid-twentieth century conservation efforts within these constraints. 
To begin, some fundamental questions arise in the analysis of salmon management: why did manag­
ers make the decisions they did? What were limits faced by managers and the science they relied 
on? Also, how did political, economic, and cultural forces impact these decisions? By addressing 
these questions in a historical analysis, a fuller understanding of modern salmon management in 
Alaska is found. Answering these questions shapes this thesis and supports the argument that eco­
nomic, political, and cultural factors often influenced changing policies as much as technological 
advances and ecological understanding did. In particular, Alaska’s unique transition to statehood in 
the mid-twentieth century -  a period when huge advances in ecology were underway -  highlights 
how science often took a backseat to other concerns.
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Introduction
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to 
the people for common use.
-Alaska Constitution Article VIII, §3
Fish, forests, wildlife, grasslands, and all other replenishable resources belonging to 
the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained yield principle, 
subject to preferences among beneficial uses.
-Alaska Constitution Article VIII, §4
No exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in 
the natural waters of the State. This section does not restrict the power of the State 
to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent 
economic distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood 
and to promote the efficient development of aquaculture in the State.
-Alaska Constitution Article VIII, §15
The decline of Chinook salmon in recent years is a modern example of a long-term prob­
lem: multiple drainages are seeing disastrously low returns of king salmon. A 2014 press release 
issued by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s National Marine Fisheries 
Service reported the Yukon River, Kuskokwim River, and Cook Inlet (including the Kenai River, 
the most popular recreational king salmon fishery in Alaska) had experienced “commercial fishery 
failure^].”1 Alaska Governor Sean Parnell quickly asked the U.S. Department of Commerce for a 
disaster declaration. His request was answered; the three regions experiencing commercial fishery 
failures were declared disasters and the state of Alaska was slated to receive nearly $21 million 
in disaster relief funds during the 2014 fiscal year. The conditions for use of the relief funds were 
ambiguous, but one objective was, according to NOAA Fisheries Alaska Regional Administrator 
Jim Balsiger, to “restore the fishery or prevent a similar failure in the future.”2 This vague directive
1 Julie Speegle, “Alaska Salmon Fisheries to Receive nearly $21M in Fishery Disaster Relief Funds,” NOAA 
Fisheries, National Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Regional Office (February 26, 2014). alaskafisheries.noaa.gov
2 Ibid.
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underscores the problem that has plagued the industry in its relations with governments for over a 
century -  how to maintain a sustainable salmon harvest.
Without a doubt, the salmon fishery in Alaska has been at the forefront of natural resource 
debates, providing examples of ineffective, misunderstood, and controversial policies, as well as 
many missed opportunities to better understand the resource. Evolving scientific understanding of 
salmon has played a role in the management of Alaska’s most enduring natural resource industry, 
but is often overshadowed by political, economic, cultural and social factors. Therefore, a careful, 
historical examination of conflict and change in the management of Alaska salmon reveals impor­
tant insights into a fundamental issue of natural resource management: how to reconcile biological 
limitations with competing economic demands and cultural practices. In 1980, Malcolm Haddon, 
who is currently the Senior Fisheries Modeller at Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organisation, stated that “if fisheries scientists have failed, it is in not educating those who 
make decisions in fisheries management to work within the limits of what is biologically possible 
instead of within the bounds set by what is economically required.”3
In the early to mid twentieth century, scientists focused on fundamental biological limitations 
of salmon populations, and trusted that the public’s economic appetite would not overwhelm the 
seemingly endless natural resource. Like today, managers and scientists were tasked with defining, 
quantifying, and ensuring the future of this vital natural resource based on incomplete knowledge 
and constraints imposed by economic and cultural demands. This study contextualizes modern 
salmon management in Alaska by analyzing early- to mid-twentieth century conservation efforts 
within these constraints. To begin, some fundamental questions arise in the analysis of salmon
3 As quoted in Malcolm Haddon, Modeling and Quantitative Methods in Fisheries, 2nd ed. (New York: CRC Press, 
2011), 7.
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management: why did managers make the decisions they did? What were limits faced by managers 
and the science they relied on? Too, how did political, economic, and cultural forces impact these 
decisions? By addressing these questions in a historical analysis, a fuller understanding of modern 
salmon management in Alaska is found. Answering these questions shapes this thesis and supports 
the argument that economic, political, and cultural factors often influenced changing policies as 
much as technological advances and ecological understanding did. In particular, Alaska’s unique 
transition to statehood in the mid-twentieth century -  a period when huge advances in ecology were 
underway -  highlights how science often took a backseat to other concerns.
Data and Methods
This study was driven by primary source analysis. While the secondary sources provided 
in the literature review offered an analytical framework and historical background, little primary 
source research had been done on the Alaskan salmon industry. I focused on archival material such 
as newspapers, federal fisheries reports, and legislation. Many of the sources were available digitally, 
allowing me to expand my research beyond what was immediately available at the University of 
Alaska Fairbanks’ Rasmuson Library. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration had 
digitized and made available annual federal fisheries reports from the late 19th century to the mid 
twentieth century. These reports provided a majority of policy and management related information 
and helped with the analysis of legislation.
The environmental policy section of this thesis required analysis of not only legislation, but 
also economic and fisheries data provided digitally from various federal and state agencies. The Alaska 
Department of Fish & Game has archived commercial harvest data for salmon that I was able to access.
This study is an interdisciplinary analysis of the Alaska commercial salmon fishery. I apply
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analytical tools established in the fields of environmental history and political economy. My dis­
cussion of the relationship between humans and their environment -  specifically, the relationship 
between fishery managers, scientists, commercial fishermen, and policymakers to salmon and their 
environment -  draws heavily from analytical methods established by environmental historians, 
which will be discussed in greater detail in the literature review. In chapters four and five I utilize 
methods established in the field of political economy. For example, I apply the common pool 
resource theory established by prominent political scientists to analyze the salmon industry and 
suggest alternatives. In addition to interpretation of historical primary sources and environmental 
policy, I rely heavily on fisheries science. I worked closely with experts in the field to provide a 
detailed biological understanding of salmon.4
My academic research is complimented by my years of personal experience with the Alaska 
salmon fishery as a technician with the Alaska Department of Fish and game. This study was inspired 
by field research involving salmon in Alaska and a passion for fisheries conservation. Having been 
around fishery science I realized that management is far more complicated than compiling field 
data. The human element is as complex and dynamic as the resource itself, and an understanding 
of one requires an understanding of the other. This study aims to demonstrate the human influences 
on the Alaska salmon industry.
Outline
This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Each chapter tracks the development of ecological 
understanding and technological ability as applied to management of Alaska’s salmon fishery.
4 I worked with Dr. Megan McPhee, assistant professor at the University of Alaska Fairbanks’ School of Fisheries 
and Ocean Sciences, who specializes in salmon management and conservation to insure accuracy in my discussion 
on Pacific salmon life histories. I have also discussed fisheries management strategies, ideas for new strategies, and 
challenges to management with a number of biologists at the Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
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Simultaneously, it explores economic and cultural shifts that required alternative approaches to 
fishery management. The chapter “Salmon Life Histories” demonstrates the biological complex­
ity of salmon as a genus. By exploring various life histories of the five species of Pacific salmon a 
better understanding of the biological and ecological hurdles in management developed. Interest­
ingly, the complexity and uncertainty of salmon have made ideologically and culturally determined 
management strategies easier to justify and thus offers a unique opportunity to analyze the effect 
of cultural values on a natural resource.
The third chapter, “Federal Management During the Territorial Period,” explores various 
aspects of accepted salmon management practices in the early twentieth century. This era was 
primarily characterized by the introduction of hatcheries to Alaska, the implementation of eradi­
cation programs to cull Dolly Varden and other salmon predators in hopes of increasing overall 
salmon abundance, and the development of an escapement based management system that utilized 
periodic stream closures. While each of these three main approaches illustrate the development of 
biological and ecological understanding during the early twentieth century, they also shed light on 
the cultural, economic, and political concerns of the time. Simple solutions demonstrated limited 
ecological understanding, but also the struggle to reconcile economic opportunity -  represented in 
this section by the introduction of hatcheries and predator fish eradication programs -  with scientific 
understanding -  represented by escapement-based management. In the early twentieth century one 
suffered to accommodate the other.
These changes in understanding were encouraged by increased technological capability. 
E.S. Russell’s biomass equation from 1931 marked the start of a movement to theoretically quantify 
salmon populations. However, these attempts to model salmon populations represent the limitations 
of technology during the time. Complex population models represented more what could be done
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using differential calculus than actual salmon populations. Despite the limitations, these modeling 
techniques laid the foundation for fishery science today, and demonstrated the role of technology 
in not only understanding fish, but in understanding how fish were managed.
The fourth chapter, “Transition to Statehood and State Management,” focuses on the estab­
lishment of Alaskan management as we know it today. I will discuss whether the State Constitution 
provided an effective legal and political framework to address reconciliation between biological 
possibility and economic and political demand. Like the methods it was used to justify--hatcheries 
and predator fish eradication--the document revealed how and why political and economic concerns 
could as or more influential than biological and ecological understanding. Similarly, open access, 
common use, and sustained yield directly demonstrated the relationship between politics and con­
servation, especially the underlying tensions between Alaskans and federal managers. While there 
is little doubt that before statehood, Alaskans were placed on the periphery and that the powerful 
cannery syndicates located outside of the Territory overshadowed regional economic interests, the 
story of how these issues were integrated into state policy and natural resource management is far 
more compelling. In many ways, statehood advocates laid the foundation for salmon management 
as we know it today and it was the direct result of political strife, economic concerns, and the utili­
zation of fishery science to promote an Alaskan fishery. By using industrial salmon traps as a case 
study, the political, economic, and social tensions of the mid-twentieth century can be demonstrated.
The fifth chapter, “Possible Solutions to Management,” draws attention to modern salmon 
management in Alaska. Using the history of the resource in Alaska, we better understand the 
complexity of working within the confines of biology and economics. This chapter explores a 
quota-based marine salmon fishery as an alternative to the risk-prone open access harvest strategy 
that is currently accepted. While we can identify a quota-based management strategy as the most
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representative of biological and ecological understanding, the political, cultural, and economic 
concerns pose a great hurdle.
Along with a quota system, this chapter also looks at the possibility of reintroducing fish 
traps to the Alaska salmon fishery. Though fish traps had been used during federal management 
in territorial days, they represented outside interests and the exclusion of local fishermen from 
participating in the resource. While the argument could certainly be made that fish traps were bio­
logically destructive in the context of an open access fishery, they would certainly prove valuable 
in a quota-based system.
Each example shows various aspects of fishery management while simultaneously dem­
onstrating how strategies changed over time. Hatcheries and predator fish eradication offers an 
analysis of economic imperatives and escapement-based management, demonstrating the struggle 
to incorporate ecological necessity into management decisions. Additionally, Fish traps during the 
transition to Alaska statehood illustrate the power of political and cultural imperatives in fishery 
management decision-making. When each of those factors are analyzed in the context of develop­
ing of technology, biological and ecological understanding, and fishery modeling techniques the 
complexity of fishery management decisions are emphasized.
Literature Review
Although older histories of the Alaskan salmon industry recognize its economic importance, 
they do not engage the wider discussion that includes the role of biological understanding and cul­
tural issues that also influence the narrative. These classical arguments are exemplified by works 
like The State o f Alaska by Ernest Gruening, Politics and Conservation: The Decline o f the Alaska 
Salmon by Richard A. Cooley, “Regulation of Commercial Salmon Fisheries: A Case of Confused
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Objectives” by Ralph W. Johnson, and The Future o f Alaska: Economic Consequences o f Statehood 
by George W. Rogers.5 These works were written in the same era that they were analyzing. In this 
sense, these sources embody a mindset that demonstrated attitudes towards the resource and can 
also be used as primary sources in the narrative of the developing Alaskan cultural and political 
identity. Overall, however, they presented narrative histories that argued federal neglect of Alaska 
and the advantages of statehood; an approach that reflected cultural perceptions more than objec­
tive analysis.
More pertinent to this thesis are environmental histories from scholars such as Joseph Taylor, 
David Arnold, Lissa Wadewitz, James A. Lichatowich, and Peter Alagona that engage similar ques­
tions. Each argues that culture, politics, and economic concerns influence fishery legislation and 
management as much as biological and ecological understanding, but few address Alaska specifi­
cally. For example, Joseph Taylor, one of the preeminent scholars on salmon history, focuses largely 
on what makes salmon management so complex. In his article “Well Thinking Men and Women,” 
Taylor addressed the 1924 White Act and the meaning of conservation in Alaska.6 It was Taylor 
who noted that early conservationists roughly fell into two camps: efficiency and equity. Herbert 
Hoover represented efficiency by trusting that the free market was more efficient than government, 
while Dan Sutherland represented equity in his belief that government should play a stronger role 
in regulating natural resource industries. Each subgroup had the same goal, but disagreed on how 
to reach it. Taylor emphasized how looking at the underlying political and cultural motivations ex­
5 Ernest Gruening, The State o f  Alaska: The Definitive History o f  A m erica’s Northernmost Frontier (New York: 
Random House, 1968), Richard Cooley, Politics and Conservation: The Decline o f  the Alaska Salmon (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1963), Ralph W. Johnson, “Regulation of commercial salmon fishermen: a case of confused objectives,” 
Pacific Northwest Quarterly 55, no. 4 (October 1964), George Rogers, Alaska in Transition: the Southeast Region 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).
6 Joseph Taylor III, “’Well-Thinking Men and Women’: The Battle for the White Act and the Meaning of Conservation 
in the 1920s,” Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (August 2002), pp. 357-387.
8
pose the paradoxical nature of resource management and conservationist attitudes towards resource 
development: government is essential in establishing effective conservation policy, while capitalism 
encourages free market solutions and the limiting of government intervention.
Additionally, in his book Making Salmon, Taylor addressed the salmon management crisis 
head-on. Though the book focused on the Pacific Northwest salmon crisis, his study demonstrated 
the political complexity of salmon management and the inherent instability of an open access 
fishery. He argued that when stakeholders have perceived equal rights to the fishery, they defined 
their relationship to the resource in ways that made them feel they deserved preferential treatment. 
Thus conflict was all but inevitable. As Taylor pointed out, “the essence of the salmon crisis is the 
struggle to define and solve a complicated environmental and social problem, but resolution has 
been elusive because participants have little in common.”7 The major theme throughout the book 
that was addressed both in the introduction and conclusion was the importance of taking responsi­
bility for past actions in order to ensure successful salmon management in the future. “We need to 
stop making salmon and to stop blaming other people, “ Taylor argued, because “both the problems 
and the solutions are, and always have been, our collective responsibility.”8 He made a point that 
hatcheries and superficial quick fixes would not serve as long-term solutions, and that the only 
answer was to develop a unified conservation front.
While this history revolved around the salmon industry and the role of science in social 
and cultural relationships, it dealt primarily with human relationships and the near impossibility of 
managing a resource to any one interest group’s standard. Utilization was varied, and each group 
blamed another for the collapse of the salmon industry. This oversimplification both intensified
7 Ibid, 4.
8 Ibid, 257.
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tensions between stakeholders while simultaneously distracting people from reaching any sort of 
rational conservation strategy; if one interest group or another could be blamed for the collapse of 
the industry the burden of comprehensive, management strategies were unnecessary. One simplistic 
solution to the crisis that Taylor refers to in Making Salmon is hatcheries, as the title suggests. Like 
blaming one group or another, simple solutions to a complex problem were impediments to further 
understanding of the resource.
The necessity of salmon for ecological health and the emphasis on the human role as mem­
bers of that ecosystem are a common theme in modern salmon histories. Each study emphasizes 
the complexity of the resource, places salmon at the center of human analysis, and champions 
complex solutions to complex problems. James Lichatowich, focusing on the Pacific Northwest, 
discusses the ecological consequences of the salmon industry as well as the impact of other natural 
resource industries on salmon. Instead of viewing the salmon industry as an entity independent of 
others, Lichatowich described the effect of logging, agriculture, and mining on salmon populations. 
Solutions in salmon conservation extend beyond salmon themselves. He argued that our inherent 
dependency on, and belief in, technology to fix all of our environmental problems is flawed, and 
that salmon conservation must return to fundamentals. Producing hatchery-raised salmon is a quick 
fix that leads to an almost inevitable conclusion: the degradation of wild salmon stocks and result­
ing ecological damage. Instead, humans need to redefine their relationship to the natural world and 
establish a new land ethic. The fundamental obstacle to developing a new ethic is technology, but 
also a fishery that is open to everyone. An open access fishery, however, Lichatowich argued, makes 
management exponentially more difficult.9
9 James A. Lichatowich, Salmon Without Rivers: A History O f The Pacific Salmon Crisis (Washington D.C.: Island 
Press, 1999).
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David Montgomery argued similarly in King o f Fish: The Thousand-Year Run o f Salmon 
where he analyzes the progression of salmon management from its roots in 17th century England 
to the modern Pacific Northwest. His study emphasizes the need to reevaluate the human relation­
ship to the natural world. His solution to the fisheries crisis is to understand salmon as a member of 
the same ecosystem as humans. Our actions have much more far-reaching effects than previously 
believed. These kinds of conflicts tie the new histories together based on emphasizing the inherent 
complexity of and open access industry and the need for a multi-pronged approach to salmon con­
servation. He argued that by relying on technology to fix environmental problems like the collapse 
of salmon runs, we are offering palliatives rather than long-term solutions.10
While modern histories often divorce themselves from past works, certain revisionist his­
torians like Stephen Haycox have readdressed many of the questions raised by classical Alaska 
historians. Haycox produced a study that explored the neglect thesis, which is the notion that the 
territory of Alaska was economically, politically, and culturally neglected by the federal government. 
While Haycox wrote that although he does not agree with the neglect thesis, there are remnants that 
remain useful. Primarily, Haycox argued that Alaska was an American colony in that it was heavily 
reliant on outside interests, its natural resources (primarily salmon) were managed by the federal 
government, and the territory was dependent on a single resource at any given time. In this way he 
aligned with Alaska territorial governor and historian Ernest Gruening tracked Alaska’s economic 
history in relation to the prominent resource extraction industries, but offered a post-colonial model 
to explain Alaska’s past and present. Similarly, Taylor argued that the White Act reinforced the idea 
of Alaska as a colony, and that salmon were the center of the ongoing debate.11
10 David Montgomery, King o f  Fish: The Thousand-Year Run o f  Salmon (Cambridge: Westview Press,
2003).
11 Stephen Haycox, Alaska: An American Colony (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006). Haycox
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However, with the new age of Alaska historians like Haycox, renewed interest in the Alaska 
salmon industry has raised interest in the analysis of salmon management efforts as in Steve Colt’s 
“Salmon Fish Traps in Alaska.”12 In his 1999 study, Steve Colt argued that fish traps were the 
embodiment of efficiency. Economically, the fish trap was the most practical, marking significant 
profits when most commercial fishermen operated at a net loss. Managerially, he argued that fish 
traps are much more efficient as well. Being stationary, officials can simply keep track of operat­
ing traps and do not have to chase salmon around the ocean. The main argument against fish traps 
was that they limited jobs in the fishing industry. While Colt conceded this point, he also pointed 
out that fish traps were labor intensive. Setting up, maintaining, and operating fish traps required a 
great deal of work. The jobs that were lost in the fishing industry would have been made up for in 
the non-fishing aspects of fish traps. Additionally, fish traps operated at a net profit, on average 12% 
higher than all other fishing methods. In Colt’s revision of the efficiency argument, he stated that 
the best hope for Alaskan salmon and the Alaskan salmon industry was the fish trap; the opposite 
of the argument made only a few decades earlier.13
Arguably, David F. Arnold’s work is the only comprehensive study on Alaska history that 
places salmon at the center. The U.S. focused on natural resource extraction like the Russians be­
fore them, he noted, but their sights were set on the millions of salmon they saw flooding inland 
rivers and streams. In almost an instant, canners moved their operations from the Pacific Northwest 
to what they saw as the virgin waters of the North Pacific. The native groups in Southeast Alaska 
were now faced with direct competition for the resource that was the foundation of their subsistence
demonstrated a substantial shift in Alaska historiography. However, other newer histories adhere to traditional 
narratives of Alaska’s past. Klaus Naske’s discussion on the salmon fishery in his 2011 study Alaska: A  History fell in 
line with the orthodox narrative.
12 Steve Colt, “Salmon Fish Traps in Alaska,” Institute o f  Social and Economic Research (Anchorage: University of 
Alaska Anchorage, 1999).
13 Colt.
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economy. In addition to the competition, The United States saw salmon as an open access resource, 
the opposite of strict native ownership rights. Not only had the United States introduced compe­
tition for Southeast groups, they completely changed the rules. Instead of being equal members 
of a market as they had under Russian rule, Tlingits and other groups were exploited by the new 
American capitalist economy. This open access fishery created social tensions between Americans 
as well as Natives.14
In the early nineteenth century conservationists were divided as to how to best manage this 
booming salmon industry. Open access, based on the belief that each fisherman should have equal 
right to the resource, created tensions between different groups. Each fisherman saw the bounty of 
the ocean as his and saw other fishermen and fishing methods as a threat.
The majority of Arnold’s study dealt with fish traps, federal management, and the economic 
significance of the salmon. He effectively demonstrated how political decisions tied to these other 
factors affected fishermen, both Native and white. The commercialization of the salmon fishery led 
Native groups to develop a “mixed-subsistence-market economy,” where individuals would return 
to ancestral fishing spots and put up food for winter, while simultaneously fishing for the market. 
Whereas white fishermen came to embody the “frontier” ideology: imposing capitalist modes of 
production on natural systems.
Also valuable to understanding the history of the Alaska salmon industry is the imposition 
of human borders as a symbolic assertion of property rights. As pointed out in The Nature o f Bor­
ders, Lissa K. Wadewitz explored political boundaries in the open ocean. She discussed that Native 
groups established boundaries in order to define access and property rights that would (whether
14 David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska, (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2008).
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intentionally or unintentionally) prevent overexploitation. Later Euro-Americans also applied borders 
to the ocean between the U.S. and Canada. While these boundaries are artificial, Wadewitz argued, 
they have played a critical role in the history of the salmon fishery. Interestingly, both Native and 
Non-Native borders were drawn through the middle of salmon runs. Wadewitz’s study focused on 
the “relationships between political concepts of space and the ways that people have managed the 
salmon fishery of the Salish Sea for centuries.”15
Wadewitz follows a similar structure as earlier salmon histories, such as Taylor’s and 
Arnold’s, but applies a new analytical lens by examining the political, economic, and social impli­
cations of artificial borders. Like the boundaries that European farmers created for the development 
of agriculture in New England (see William Cronon’s Changes in the Land) borders in the Salish 
Sea illustrate a particular culturally and economically determined approach to land use and resource 
development.16
Wadewitz argued that for Americans and Canadians, the border in the Salish Sea represented 
different conservation ideologies. The United States managed their side, and the Canadians man­
aged their side. Salmon, on the other hand, did not recognize these artificial borders and crossed 
back and forth. Thus, the same salmon runs were being managed by two (sometimes contradictory) 
management strategies. For example, if the salmon fishery were closed on the United States side 
of the border but not the Canadian side, fishermen from the United States side would sneak over 
and catch the salmon there. These fishermen became known as bandits or pirates. By discussing 
differences between Native and Non-Native borders, as well as later American/Canadian political
15 Lissa K. Wadewitz, The Nature o f  Borders: Salmon, Boundaries, and Bandits on the Salish Sea (Seattle: University 
of Washington Press, 2012), 6.
16 William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians, Colonists, and the Ecology o f  New England  (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1983).
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borders, Wadewitz demonstrated the difficulties of salmon management. She stated that Native land- 
claim borders helped conserve the salmon fishery because of the limited access and the practice of 
sharing the catch. She went on to say, “White newcomers drew borders that revealed the cultural 
and economic marginalization of salmon and created a new social geography that would remain 
permeable and contested for decades.”17 Thus, borders had much different conservation and social 
implications than previous histories explored.
Interestingly, one particularly useful study had nothing to do with Alaska or salmon. Rather, 
Peter Alagona’s book, After the Grizzly: Endangered Species and the Politics o f Place in California, 
focused on how political perceptions shape the way humans perceive the natural world.18 In turn, 
he demonstrated how the natural world can be used as a political tool. In 1973, the United States 
Congress passed what many consider the most controversial environmental law with nearly unani­
mous support: the Endangered Species Act (ESA). Peter Alagona argued that the ESA remains “one 
of the most formidable and comprehensive U.S. environmental statutes but also the most ambitious 
biodiversity conservation measure ever enacted by any country.”19 This ambitious conservation 
undertaking demonstrated a profound shift in conservation ideology and the role of the federal 
government in conservation efforts.
Alagona’s study was motivated by the question: “how did the United States develop a political 
system capable of producing and sustaining debates in which endangered species serve as proxies 
for broader cultural conflicts with far-reaching social and economic consequences?”20 This question 
was based on the idea that when conservationists describe critical habitat for endangered species,
17 Ibid, 168.
18 Peter Alagona, After the Grizzly: Endangered Species and the Politics o f  Place in California (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2013).
19 Ibid , 4.
20 Ibid, 3.
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the term habitat has many different meanings depending on the argument. Thus, Alagona argued 
that by analyzing endangered species we are better able to understand the complex conservation 
debate that encompasses political and scientific roles.
While Alagona’s study focuses on federal expansion through the lens of wildlife conserva­
tion, he raised interesting points regarding the relationship between science and legislation. He 
noted that even today scientists point to the perceived chasm between science and legislation that 
hampers effective conservation practices. Alagona’s study demonstrated that science and legislation 
grew together, which he described as “coproduction” or “hybrid concepts.” Alagona argued, “today 
it is impossible to provide a complete definition of either habitat or endangered species without 
referring to both science and the law and the relations between them.”21 He then developed his 
overarching theme of the developing relationship between science and law to describe expansion 
of federal power.
Interpretations regarding human management of salmon have become more and more com­
plicated as salmon have moved from the periphery -  a resource to be exploited -  to the center of 
human stories. Increases in scientific knowledge and developments within the field of history have 
allowed scholars to revisit classical arguments and redefine the role of salmon and humans within 
a larger ecosystem. These studies suggest that the dynamism of salmon populations, competing 
management philosophies and cultural perspectives are all necessary in order to better understand 
Alaska history.
Drawing from these models, this study engages many of these ideas in order to readdress the 
role of salmon in Alaska history. It moves beyond classical narratives and follows newer examples 
that insist it is impossible to separate the history of a resource from its political and cultural con­
21 Ibid, 4.
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texts. To borrow from Alagona, each requires the other to develop a more comprehensive, complex 
narrative.
All of these studies demonstrate the need to analyze humans and the environment as members 
of the same ecosystem. Taylor, Arnold, Wadewitz, Lichatowich, and Alagona all present content 
and analytical frameworks that place humans within the ecosystems, and reveal the influence of 
human politics, culture, and economics on biological and ecological communities. These studies 
emphasize the need to revisit histories of natural resource development in order to specifically ad­
dress the disconnect between humans and their environment. The premise that humans exist apart 
from the natural world implies an omniscience that inhibits objective analysis of natural resource 
development. A history of the Alaska salmon industry that introduces humans as another preda­
tor in a complex ecosystem is representative of the interactions between humans and the natural 
world. Salmon management represents evolving understanding of the natural world, but also human 
responses to a dynamic ecosystem.
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Chapter 1 Pacific Salmon Life Histories
1. 1 Introduction
In 1931 E. S. Russell stated that managing a fishery “is admittedly a difficult task, for the 
conditions to be taken into account are extremely complex and extremely variable, and the data 
available are as a rule incomplete and not always easy to interpret in an unequivocal way.” 1 His 
declaration is equally true today, and we can use the genus Oncorhynchus to illustrate the challenges 
of management. The intricacies of Pacific salmon life histories are still debated, which in itself is a 
testament to the complexity of the genus. Interestingly, these complexities and uncertainties make 
cultural, political, and economic management schemes easier to justify. Fundamental gaps in bio­
logical and ecological understanding of salmon provide opportunities for other strategies that are 
difficult to dismiss on scientific grounds. Throughout the history of the industry, economic demands 
have competed with scientific understanding. In attempting to understand the human -salmon rela­
tionships, one must also understand what salmon biologists know about them as a biotic community. 
Thomas P. Quinn, a widely recognized expert in the field, provides a comprehensive background 
in, The Behavior and Ecology o f Pacific Salmon and Trout.2
This chapter describes the life histories of Pacific salmon starting with the juvenile stages 
and smoltification -  the transition period where juvenile salmon physiologically prepare for a life 
in the ocean -  followed by a description of marine feeding behavior and open ocean migration, 
and finally the homeward migration of adult salmon to spawn. Each stage of a Pacific salmon life 
histories poses challenges to management and still perplexes fishery scientists.
1 E. S. Russell, “Some Theoretical Considerations on the ‘Overfishing’ Problem,” Journal du Conseil International 
pour l ’Exploration de la M er 6 (1931), 3.
2 Thomas P. Quinn, The Behavior and Ecology o f  Pacific Salmon and Trout, (Seattle, University of Washington 
Press, 2005). Quinn, a professor of aquatic and fishery sciences at the University of Washington, is an expert on 
salmon behavior, ecology, and population dynamics.
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1.2 Pacific Salmon Life Histories
Within the genus Oncorhynchus are the species commonly referred to as the five Pacific 
salmon species: pink salmon (O. gorbuscha), chum or dog salmon (O. keta), sockeye or red salmon 
(O. nerka), coho or silver salmon (O. kisutch), and Chinook or king salmon (O. tshawytscha).3 While 
there are numerous inter- and intra-species variations, Quinn clarifies that all salmon species are 
characterized by anadromy, homing and semelparity, although not all individuals within a species 
fit within these analytical confines.4
Anadromy, along with homing and semelparity, make salmon especially vulnerable to vari­
ous environmental changes. Anadromy is a life history in which a fish is born and returns to spawn 
in freshwater, but feeds in the ocean. While most salmon make the long journey downriver to feed 
in the ocean where they grow to maturity, there are examples of male (and very rare examples of 
female) coho, chinook, and sockeye salmon that spend their entire lives in fresh water. While they 
do not grow to the size of salmon that mature in the ocean, there is evidence of reproductive suc­
cess. These precocious males are referred to as “jacks,” or “residual males.” Jacks use a ‘sneaking’ 
tactic:’ smaller males stay out of sight of large males, and race in to fertilize the eggs as the female 
releases them before they are chased off by the larger males.5
Homing is the salmon trait of returning to their natal streams to spawn. This results in geneti­
cally isolated populations of salmon with regionally specific adaptations. One species of salmon 
may have genetically unique traits such as run timing, body size, and energy stores. While homing
3 This study will refer to these five as Pacific salmon, though there are three additional species that are members 
of the genus, and meet all the criteria of Pacific salmon, but are seldom referred to when discussing Pacific salmon: 
Masu or cherry salmon (O. masou), which is found in Japan; Steelhead or, when non-anadromous, Rainbow trout 
(O. mykiss); and Coastal or Sea Run cutthroat (O. clarkii).
4 Ibid, 5-6.
5 Nathan J. Mantua, Steven R. Hare, Yuan Zhang, John M. Wallace, and Rovert C. Francis, “A Pacific Interdecadal 
Climate Oscillation with Impacts on Salmon Production,” Bulletin o f  the American Meteorological Society (June 1, 
1997), 1076.
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is generally the rule, like all general assertions regarding salmon, there are exceptions. Straying is a 
phenomenon whereby individuals diverge to explore new habitat in other rivers or tributaries. This 
may be thought of as a biological insurance policy. If a spawning habitat is blocked, destroyed, or 
no longer suitable, the population would die off if individuals never diverged from the normal pat­
tern. However, a certain number of offspring are genetically predisposed to straying to ensure future 
populations. While straying is beneficial to populations, from an evolutionary standpoint, it can be 
seen as an evolved strategy that increases the fitness of an individual, not the species as a whole.6
Semelparity refers to the ability to only spawn once, which is the case for most Pacific 
salmon. This trait explains the abundance of salmon populations, the dramatic fluctuations due 
to environmental or human factors, and, along with homing, contributes to relative genetic isola­
tion. The exceptions to this rule are Steelhead and masu salmon, which can be iteroparous (able to 
spawn more than once). Variation among and within the various species of Pacific salmon creates 
the greatest challenges to salmon management.
In spawning only once, salmon devote all of their reproductive capacity to a single cohort. 
While producing a vast number of offspring, thus abundant adult populations, this life history 
also renders the species prone to dramatic fluctuation. Salmon runs are much more affected by 
environmental phenomena than other commercially viable fish species, and a single event such as 
a volcanic eruption, landslide, or flood can significantly impact a future run. Since many salmon 
spend a specific amount of time in freshwater before smolting, a single event (i.e. flooding) could 
destroy an entire cohort from a stream or river, although straying salmon could then potentially 
recolonize the stream. The genetic isolation of populations as a result of semelparity and homing
6 Thomas P. Quinn, 6.
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is also apparent, because a female’s genetic material is concentrated. While there are variations in 
isolation, especially due to straying and different aged salmon returning to spawn, pink salmon of­
fer an extreme example: pink salmon are characterized by spawning every other year, which means 
there are even-numbered year populations, and odd-numbered year populations. Each population 
is completely genetically isolated from the other.7
The simple statement that salmon lay their eggs in freshwater overlooks the diversity of 
habitat salmon juveniles occupy within the freshwater ecosystem. For instance, Chinook salmon 
typically lay their eggs in the main channels of rivers, while coho and chum salmon usually occupy 
smaller tributaries. Sockeye salmon spawn in lakes and rivers, but more often in lakes. Pink salmon 
travel very short distances upriver to reach slower moving side channels.
1.3 Juvenile Stage and Smoltification
After the eggs hatch, they become alevins and will swim deeper into the gravel or other 
substrate and feed on their yolks until they become juveniles, a process that usually takes no more 
than a month and a half. Pink salmon juveniles typically travel to estuarine environments immedi­
ately, so the population is usually more vulnerable to ocean temperature regime shifts, like Pacific 
Decadal Oscillation, a temperature regime with positive and negative phases that influences sea 
surface temperature (SST). Chinook and coho juveniles usually spend two or three years in river­
ine ecosystems, while chum and sockeye spend less time, from immediate migration to estuarine 
environments to one or two years.8
After they have reached the appropriate age, a process called smoltification occurs wherein 
complex chemical and physiological changes take place that prompt a migration to salt water. As
7 Ibid, 6-7.
8 Ibid, 159-164.
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mentioned above, not all juveniles make this journey, and evidence shows that the ‘decision’ to 
migrate to the ocean is largely dependent on environmental factors such as water temperature and 
food abundance. There are also strong genetic relationships with smolting resulting in some spe­
cies or populations showing little variation, and others showing large variation. The smolts reach 
the ocean, where they will feed for one to seven years, depending on the species, until they reach 
maturity. Ocean feeding patterns, and the salmons’ subsequent return to spawn, are the most com­
plicated and least understood stages in their life history.9
1.4 Marine Feeding and Migration
In the marine environment salmon mingle with salmon from other drainages. A single shoal 
of feeding salmon in the Gulf of Alaska could be comprised of salmon from a variety of locations 
and species spanning from Bristol Bay, South central Alaska, Southeast Alaska, British Columbia, 
Washington, Oregon, and even to California. This reveals perplexing migration patterns that are not 
yet understood. Fishermen on the Columbia awaiting the return of Chinook or Sockeye salmon are 
thus economically and ecologically connected to the open-ocean fishermen in the Gulf of Alaska. 
This, however, is only part of the story.
Not all Pacific Northwest salmon feed in the Gulf of Alaska. Just as salmon integrate with 
other schools and species of salmon, they separate from their riverine schools to find feeding habi­
tats. So, as a school in the Gulf of Alaska may represent multiple species of salmon from multiple 
locations, salmon from a single location might occupy multiple feeding locations in the North 
Pacific. For example, Chinook salmon originating in the Yukon River may separate to join marine 
feeding schools in the Gulf of Alaska, Bering Sea, or even as far as Russian waters off the coast of
9 Ibid.
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Kamchatka. And not all salmon feed in the open ocean; some stay inshore for their entire marine 
life. Ultimately, these ocean-feeding migrations could span thousands of miles and are thought to 
be motivated primarily by food availability.10 Once the salmon reach maturity, members of feeding 
shoals disperse and the homeward migration begins. Salmon then travel back to their natal streams 
to spawn.
1.5 Homeward Migration
Migration patterns of Pacific salmon are still largely unknown. Considering the vast expanse 
of feeding areas in the North Pacific, it is remarkable that salmon that have been in the ocean for 
years know exactly when to start their migration. Scientists are still unsure exactly how, but salmon 
arrive within a few weeks of other returning salmon. Because populations and species are mixed 
at sea, we can deduce that migration timing is not determined by the school as a whole. Secondly, 
populations from one river system could have marine feeding areas that are hundreds, if not thou­
sands of miles removed from other members of the same population, so there cannot be a genetic 
clock synchronized with all the other members of the stock that initiates migration. Furthermore, 
salmon do not follow the same route homeward as they did during the outward migration, which 
proves that they do not navigate by landmark. These peculiarities illustrate the challenges to fully 
understanding salmon life histories. As Nathan Putnam et al. have noted, “in the final phase of their 
spawning migration, Pacific salmon use chemical cues to identify their home river, but how they 
navigate from the open ocean to the correct coastal area has remained enigmatic.”11 Thus even with 
the sophisticated technological capabilities fishery scientists enjoy today, critical gaps still make
10 Ibid, 243-246.
11 Nathan F. Putnam, Kenneth J. Lohmann, Emily M. Putnam, Thomas P. Quinn, A. Peter Klimley, David L. G. No- 
akes, “Evidence for geomagnetic imprinting as a homing mechanism in Pacific salmon,” Current Biology 23, no. 4 (18 
February 2013), 312.
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salmon management a challenge.
Two main questions scientists ask are: how do salmon know where to go, and how do they 
know when to go there? While these questions still mystify and perplex, certain hypotheses have 
been presented that emphasize the salmon’s level of evolutionary sophistication. In 1977, salmon 
biologist W. C. Leggett observed that salmon are “capable of obtaining directional information 
from the sun, polarized light, and geomagnetic fields...” but there is “ ...no definitive evidence” 
that migrating salmon use them as a means of orientation.12 Two independent studies supported 
this hypothesis. First, in 2003, Daryl C. Parkyn et al., a research associate professor specializing 
in ecophysiology and fish behavior at the University of Florida’s School of Forest Resources and 
Conservation, demonstrated in laboratory conditions that salmonids can detect light polarization, 
which can be used for navigation. Second, Nathan Putnam, a post-doctoral fellow at Oregon State 
University, and colleages demonstrated the use of geomagnetic imprinting on the outward migration 
of salmon, which the salmon then recalled to guide their homeward migration. More specifically, the 
study showed that salmon used a predicted route based on geomagnetic field drift until they were 
close enough to their natal streams to use chemical cues, such as smell.13 These results provided 
the first empirical evidence of geomagnetic imprinting in any species, and Putnam et al. imply that 
forecasting salmon movements is possible using geomagnetic models.14
These findings also imply a much more sophisticated mode of navigation than was previ­
ously believed, one that has not been identified in any other species. While sea turtles and some 
shark species have shown signs of being able to navigate, geomagnetic imprinting appears to be
12 As quoted in Ibid, 46.
13 For more extensive reading on polarized light navigation and geomagnetic imprinting, please refer to Daryl C. 
Parkyn, James D. Austin & Craig W. Hawryshyn, “Acquisition of polarized-light orientation in salmonids under labo­
ratory conditions,” Animal Behavior 65 (2003), 893-904 and Nathan Putnam, et al.
14 Nathan Putnam, et al, 312.
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unique to salmon. It is important to note that while feeding at sea salmon have no visual references. 
To be able to use polarized light and geomagnetic waypoint finding, fish must have a very precise 
sense of their longitudinal and latitudinal location. Once the salmon are close enough to their natal 
stream to identify chemical signatures, smell becomes the primary navigational tool.15
1.6 Adult Upriver Migration
Once the salmon reach their natal streams, a series of physiological and chemical changes 
occur that allow them to adapt, once again, to freshwater. They stop eating once they reach fresh­
water, they change color, and a majority of their energy is devoted to the development of sexual 
organs. While all salmon undergo these changes, the rate of change varies by species and distance 
from their upriver destination. Members of the same species may undergo their morphology at 
different rates depending on how far they have to travel upriver and the latitudinal location of the 
natal stream. Salmon in northern regions have different morphological rates than southern regions.
The timing of the migration also varies by species. Generally, Chinook, sockeye, and pink 
salmon start their migration in the spring, while coho salmon start their migration later in the sum­
mer. Chum salmon are the most variable of the five species; they start their migration between 
spring and late fall depending on the location of the population. Typically, stocks that have farther 
to travel will start their migration earlier so they can make it to the spawning grounds at the ideal 
time -  early enough to find optimal spawning habitat, but not so early as to exhaust all of their 
stored energy before they are able to spawn; late enough so that the river is clear of ice and the risk 
of flooding is reduced, not so late as to risk leaving the juvenile salmon vulnerable to icing before 
they are physiologically able to survive such conditions.
15 Thomas P. Quinn, 64.
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As salmon travel upriver, their bodies deteriorate, and their valuable fat stores are used in 
place of external food sources. Smaller salmon usually stay close to the bank where the current is 
weakest, and rest in pools before undertaking the next leg of their upriver journey, especially after 
a large amount of energy is exerted overcoming obstacles. By contrast, larger salmon (especially 
chinook) migrate upriver in the deepest sections of the river. Salmon biologists hypothesize that 
the reduced wave-drag on larger fish in the deeper water makes travel more energy efficient despite 
higher water flow rates.16
The upriver migration requires a considerable amount of energy expenditure. Salmon that 
must travel longer distances have a higher fat composition upon entering river systems to com­
pensate for the travel distance and required elevation ascent to the spawning grounds. According 
to Quinn, “migration and reproduction deplete the salmon of almost all their fat and about half 
their protein.”17 Thus, salmon harvested closer to the ocean have a higher caloric value than those 
harvested considerable distances upriver.
1.7 Spawning
Once they reach the spawning grounds, females dig nests, or redds, in the gravel using 
a specially choreographed dance of tail flicks. Males stay close and wait for their opportunity to 
fertilize the eggs. Redd is the term for the entire area in which a single female lays her eggs and 
is comprised of multiple egg pockets. Once the eggs in one pocket are fertilized, the female then 
covers them by digging another egg pocket upstream where she will lay the next batch of eggs. The 
substrate dug up from the new pocket upstream washes downriver and covers the previous pocket. 
Once she has finished releasing her eggs, she dies, and the cycle repeats.
16 Ibid, 67-84.
17 Richard White, The Organic Machine (New York: Hill and Wang, 1995), and Thomas Quinn, 77.
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1.8 Predation and Other Environmental Factors
At each stage of the cycle salmon experience varying degrees of vulnerability to exploita­
tion and predation. Quinn has found that the majority of mortality occurs during the juvenile stage 
in freshwater or estuarine environments. However, exploitation rates in the open ocean are still 
relatively unknown. While no hard scientific data exists, fishery researchers such as Quinn believe 
that open ocean mortality is relatively small. As the salmon start their migration back to freshwater 
and return to estuarine environments where they are more confined, predation by sea lions, whales, 
sharks, and humans increases dramatically. This is also true as salmon migrate upriver. Shallower 
water makes them more vulnerable to terrestrial and avian predators like bears and eagles.
One of the most significant contributions to modern understanding of Pacific salmon ecol­
ogy and population dynamics was the 1997 study “A Pacific Interdecadal Climate Oscillation with 
Impacts on Salmon Production,” by Nathan J. Mantua, et al. Mantua discovered an ocean current 
in the North Pacific that helped explain natural salmon population fluctuations. Pacific Decadal 
Oscillation, or PDO, is a value of variation in sea-surface temperature (SST) across the North Pacific 
that alters on a semi regular, interdecadal basis. Examining commercial harvest data, he noticed 
“a remarkable characteristic of Alaskan salmon abundance over the past half-century has been the 
large fluctuations at interdecadal timescales that resemble those of the PDO.”18 The results of this 
study influence how we interpret salmon population dynamics today, and are essential to understand­
ing the natural fluctuations that many early scientists and politicians mistakenly believed resulted 
solely from human exploitation during the first part of the twentieth century (see figures 1 and 2).
18 Nathan J. Mantua, et al. 1076.
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Figure 1: A graphic representation of Pacific Decadal Oscillation demonstrates the 
positive and negative SST phases of the North Pacific. When compared to a graph 
of commercial salmon harvest in Alaska, a correlation develops and the influence of 
the oscillating ocean current is undeniable. Source: “Pacific Decadal Oscillation,” 
National Centers for Environmental Information, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov
Figure 2: Commercial salmon harvests in Alaska. The fluctuation in populations 
based on catch data demonstrates the impact PDO has on salmon population numbers. 
By comparing the commercial harvest numbers to the PDO graph, the population 
response delay is apparent. Source: “Alaska Commercial Salmon Catches & Value 
1878-2013, All Species combined,” Alaska Department of Fish & Game, 2015. 
www.adfg.alaska.gov
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Mantua, et al. demonstrated a “bottom up” population influence.19 The ocean current shifts 
affect phytoplankton and zooplankton production, which work their way up the food web to large 
predators like salmon. Mantua postulated: “it is believed that sockeye and pink salmon abundances 
are most significantly impacted by marine climate variability early in the ocean phases of their life 
cycles.” He surmised: “If this is true, the key biophysical interactions are likely taking place in the 
near shore marine and estuarine environments where juvenile salmon are generally found.”20 This 
suggests that juvenile salmon are most affected by the shifting temperature regimes, so population 
responses are usually delayed until the juvenile population returns to spawn years later. Moreover, 
the weather changes that accompany PDO impact stream flow -  warmer temperatures translate to 
higher stream flow, cooler temperatures translate to lower stream flow -  and streams with higher 
flow typically produce more juvenile salmon. Thus oscillating sea surface temperature (SST) (which 
affects weather), affects stream flow, and along with changes in estuarine environments, could have 
a significant impact on salmon populations.21
Mantua et al. identified these impacts in a number of factors. A negative PDO, or a southern 
current shift, could support larger populations of salmon in the Pacific Northwest because cooler 
conditions hinder reproduction rates of juvenile salmon prey species. Thus, food is more abundant 
in the Pacific Northwest and support the development of mid-trophic fish. At the same time there 
would be fewer predators as a result of colder temperatures. The effect of this negative shift on 
Alaskan stocks is not well understood, but it could be that the negative phase lowers SST so that 
phytoplankton and zooplankton move farther south, resulting in less food for the juvenile salmon 
in Alaskan waters. Additionally, the increased number of Pacific Northwest stocks could increase
19 Nathan J. Mantua, et al., 1076.
20 Ibid, 1077.
21 Ibid.
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competition for resources among Alaskan stocks. The positive phase promotes Alaskan stocks be­
cause of food availability and limited predation from sharks and other warm-water species. Pacific 
Northwest stocks are disadvantaged during the positive phase by the reduced amount of food in 
estuarine environments and increased predation as a result of the warmer currents.
1.9 Conclusion
Mantua et al.’s findings help explain the fluctuation in population numbers observed by early 
scientists and managers. The fluctuations in salmon population densities are undoubtedly magnified 
by human exploitation, but are also the result of environmental conditions. As Mantua et al. noted, 
“management goals.. .may simply not be attainable when environmental conditions are unfavorable. 
Conversely, in a period of climatically favored high productivity, managers might be well advised 
to exercise caution in claiming credit for a situation that may be beyond their control.”22 This 
cautionary observation demonstrates why simple equations, and even more complex methods of 
determining quotas, fail to stabilize industrial salmon productivity. As explored in the next chapter, 
even the best science is limited by available statistics and ecological understanding, technological 
capabilities, and most significantly, economic demands.
22 Ibid, 1078.
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Chapter 2 Federal Management, 1884-1959
2.1 Introduction
Thomas Huxley, a prominent nineteenth century scientist and conservationist declared that 
“ .probably  all the great sea fisheries are inexhaustible: that is to say that nothing we do seriously 
affects the numbers of fish. And any attempt to regulate these fisheries seems consequently, from 
the nature of the case to be useless.”1 Not all conservationists shared Huxley’s optimism of a truly 
inexhaustible resource, however his ideology illustrated a familiar response when confronted with a 
resource beyond comprehension. By concluding that it was inexhaustible, Huxley not only conveyed 
a sense of optimism about the future of the resource and the industry, but (perhaps unintentionally) 
undermined the need to try to truly understand it. The consequences of unlimited resource ideol­
ogy, dovetailed with most nineteenth century attitudes towards resource extraction, but it had the 
potential to be catastrophic for salmon. Whereas federal salmon managers in Alaska understood 
that this resource was relatively finite, they not only struggled to grasp the complexity of the new 
Alaskan fishery, but also contended with dominant attitudes that prioritized economic gain.
The federal management period (District of Alaska, 1884-1912, Territory of Alaska 1912­
1959) can be characterized as a balancing act amongst political, cultural, and economic goals with 
biological and ecological limitations. Management directives focused on maintaining a certain 
level of salmon harvested, and so strategies focused on population stability. As such, hatcheries, 
predator fish eradication, the development of an escapement-based management system, and the 
start of a growing scientific study of ecology with the purpose of sustained yield, drove policy. 
Although the study of ecology did not start with Alaska salmon, or even in Alaska, this intellectual
1 Thomas H. Huxley, Inaugural address, Fisheries Exhibition Literature 4, 22 as quoted in Malcolm Haddon,
Modeling and Quantitative Methods in Fisheries, 2nd ed. (New York: CRC Press, 2011), 1.
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shift represented more holistic understandings of the natural world, and over time, became more 
influential in management decisions. Hatcheries and predator fish eradication emphasized economic 
opportunity first by producing salmon at an industrial scale, and second by eliminating threats to the 
continued viability of the industry. On the other hand, escapement-based management demonstrates 
the fundamental struggle of reconciling economic opportunity with ecological health. Escapement- 
based stream closures, as demonstrated through analyses of the Rogue River in Oregon, favored the 
sustainability of the resource but at the expense of economic opportunity, and so remained contro­
versial. Examination of these approaches highlights the efforts made to implement best practices 
at the time without compromising productivity.
2.2 Federal Fishery Science and Management
Federal management practices were firmly based on ever-developing scientific understand­
ing. Although maintaining the economic viability of the industry motivated decisions in the first 
three decades of the twentieth century, the limitations of management capacity can be attributed 
more to the lack of technology than mistaken scientific understanding. Federal fisheries scientists 
conducted research and offered industry wide information that furthered the biological and ecologi­
cal understanding of salmon and so became the leading voice on management strategy that sought 
to reconcile economic goals with ecological health.
Salmon, however, challenged managers compared to other commercially valuable fish be­
cause of their vastly different life histories. Ground fish including halibut, flounder, cod, and rockfish, 
are relatively long-lived (rockfish have been documented at more than 200 years old) and spawn 
more than once (iteroparous), resulting in much more stable population dynamics.2 Salmon, on the
2 Michael P. Fahay, Peter L. Berrien, Donna L. Johnson, and Wallace W. Morse “Essential Fish Habitat Source 
Document: Atlantic Cod, Gadus morhua, Life History and Habitat Characteristics,” NOAA Technical Memorandum
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other hand, spawn once and are relatively short lived (2-7 years depending on the species), making 
populations unpredictable and more susceptible to oceanic and local environmental fluctuations. 
Because scientists and managers were not familiar with populations in constant flux subject to en­
vironmental shifts and human activity, they tended to focus on the human impacts in management 
decisions. Consequently, policies were based more on the desire to establish a false equilibrium 
than on accommodating salmon-specific population dynamics.
Scientists, having seen significant population collapses in Pacific Northwest salmon fisher­
ies by the early 1900s, were well aware of the limits of resource exploitation. At the Conference 
of Governors in 1908, President Theodore Roosevelt, representing the relatively new voice of 
conservation, warned that the nation’s natural resources were “in danger of exhaustion if we permit 
the old wasteful methods” to continue.3 For many conservationists such as Roosevelt, the applica­
tion of contemporary scientific knowledge was the answer to sustainable use of resources. Many 
Americans agreed and had growing faith that scientific fixes could accommodate the demands of 
industrial society.4
Consequently, federal managers concerned that increased pressure from the cannery opera­
tions would lead to population collapse chose to supplement wild populations with hatcheries. In 
Alaska, economic incentives for hatcheries included tax cuts to canneries that released hatchery- 
raised salmon. As a result, commercial fishermen were harvesting salmon at rates only hatcheries 
could sustain. Hatcheries contributed to misplaced confidence in managers’ ability to stabilize what
NMFS-NE-124 (Woods Hole, Mass.: Northeast Fisheries Science Center, U.S. Department of Commerce, September 
1999), 2.
3 Proceedings o f  a Conference o f  Governors in the White House, Washington, D.C., M ay 13-15, 1908 (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1909, 3 as quoted in David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and 
Salmon in Southeast Alaska  (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2008), 75.
4 Joseph E. Taylor III, “’Well-Thinking Men and Women’: The Battle for the White Act and the Meaning of 
Conservation in the 1920s,” Pacific Historical Review  71, No. 3 (August 2002), 362.
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was actually a much more complicated situation, as discussed below.
Perhaps ironically, with increased salmon harvest because of hatcheries, more canneries 
opened in Alaska, most of which were capitalized, owned, and operated by extra-local businesses. 
These canneries employed migrant seasonal workers instead of residents, furthering Alaskans from 
participating in what they perceived as their own resource. The presence of outside interests in the 
form of canneries and their migrant employees fostered resentment towards outside interests that 
included skepticism towards the federal government’s policies that seemed to favor big business 
over local participation.
2.3 Hatcheries
Hatcheries represent one of the primary strategies of the federal management period to cope 
with declining salmon numbers. One public statement to the Alaska newspaper, the Petersburg Weekly 
Report, suggested that hatcheries were the only possible way to ensure the salmon industry’s future 
commercial viability.5 However, they did meet some resistance. In 1915, Hugh H. Smith, the United 
States Commissioner of Fisheries, reported that in Alaska, “the plan of operating private hatcheries 
is not looked upon with favor at the present time.” 6 In order to encourage private industry to take 
part in the large-scale effort, government provided economic incentives, or “hatchery rebates,” at 
the rate of “40 cents for every thousand red or king salmon fry released;” roughly equivalent to the 
tax on ten cases of canned salmon.7
This policy had a fundamental flaw, as pointed out by David F. Arnold in The Fishermen’s
5 M. S. Perkins, “Drastic Action Necessary,” The Petersburg Weekly Report (Friday, November 19, 1920).
6 Hugh H. Smith, “Salmon Hatcheries,” Report o f  the United States Commissioner o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 
1915 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 21-2.
7 Ibid.
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Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska.8 Salmon rebates were based on the number of 
fry released, not the number that actually supplemented wild salmon populations. Furthermore, 
the policy placed no onus on industry to understand the ecological consequences of their actions; 
hatchery operators focused too much on the number of eggs and juveniles produced, and not enough 
on explaining why they did not return as adults. Today, studies have shown that since homing is 
genetic, some hatchery fish will return to their ancestral streams, and others may stray to colonize 
new habitat. Hatchery-produced strays have a number of adverse effects on wild populations. First, 
hatchery fish are inbred, and therefore lack the genetic diversity of wild populations. When hatch­
ery strays breed with wild populations, this inbreeding and lack of genetic diversity can limit the 
long-term success of the wild population. Secondly, the overabundance of hatchery strays could 
limit resources available to wild populations and increase competition for spawning sites. Finally, 
hatchery-raised salmon have a serious effect on commercial harvest reports and escapement counts 
because they provide a false sense of returning wild salmon populations, and encourage increased 
exploitation that is not environmentally sustainable.9
Additionally, hatchery operations focused on supplementing the profitable sockeye and 
chinook fisheries and disregarded naturally occurring population abundances in less economically 
desirable species. For example, in Southeast Alaska pink salmon are the most abundant salmon 
species, and by releasing sockeye and chinook fry by the millions, as Arnold pointed out, hatchery 
operators “sought to impose an unnatural order upon the fishery based on market considerations 
rather than the region’s natural history,” thereby contributing to ecological imbalances.10
8 David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2008).
9 Peter Westley, Post-doctoral fellow, University of Washington, Affiliate Faculty, University of Alaska Fair­
banks School of Fisheries and Ocean Sciences, “Homing and Straying of Anadromous Pacific Salmon,” PowerPoint 
presentation (12 September 2013).
10 David F. Arnold, The Fishermen’s Frontier: People and Salmon in Southeast Alaska (Seattle: University of
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The problems in the early twentieth century continue to today, and the hatchery debate is 
still heated. Professor of Aquatic and Fishery Sciences at the University of Washington, Thomas 
P. Quinn noted that, though hatcheries are perceived as a way to counter overfishing and return 
runs to their original abundance, “such efforts masked the decline of wild populations and often 
accelerated [overfishing] by encouraging fishing levels that only hatchery runs could sustain.”11 
However controversial, hatcheries dominated the twentieth century management landscape 
and were, and still are, seen as a tool to sustain a booming industry. David R. Montgomery, author 
of King o f Fish: The Thousand-Year Run o f Salmon, attributed the success of these fishery engines 
to two major factors: “they pumped cash and resources into facilities run by fish commissions; and 
they avoided the political problems associated with dealing with the known environmental causes of 
salmon decline.”12 Hatcheries represented an answer to what were seen as human-initiated popula­
tion fluctuations and met the goals of scientists and managers, who sought to reconcile economic 
stability with accepted conservation practices of the time. The simple solution to any fluctuation 
was: make more fish. By the 1920s, hatcheries were an accepted conservation practice, and were 
seen as the symbol of scientific ingenuity and man’s ability to harness nature.
2.4 Predator Fish Eradication
Along with hatcheries, federal management included aggressive predatory fish eradication 
to try and increase the number of salmon. 13 In the Report o f the Commissioner o f Fisheries, Com­
missioner George M. Bowers reported, “the duties of the agents at the salmon fisheries in Alaska
Washington Press, 2008) 86.
11 Thomas P. Quinn, 321.
12 David R. Montgomery, King o f  Fish: The Thousand-Year Run o f  Salmon (Cambridge: Westview Press, 2003) 161.
13 Today predator control represents an oversimplified answer to an extraordinarily complex problem, but at the time 
conservationists accepted it as a key part of wildlife management.
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have primarily to do only with the various phases of the salmon industry.” Tangentially, the work 
done with the Alaska salmon fisheries “afford[ed] opportunity for a survey of the other fisheries as 
well.”14 Bowers explained, “the almost equally important study of the creatures that... act as enemies 
to those of economic value.”15 Nature thus represented a battleground: animals with economic value 
were favored, and those without were seen as natural enemies.
In 1913, Dolly Varden, were “so abundant as to be a great nuisance and very destructive 
to salmon spawn,” and became the target of eradication.16 Deemed undesirable as human food, 
scientists like Dennis Winn declared the species “detrimental to the salmon industry,” and endorsed 
eradication programs.17 The United States Bureau of Fisheries, and the newly established Alaska 
Territorial Fish Commission, worked together to wage a war against these enemies of the salmon.
“We are thoroughly convinced,” Dennis Winn, a field biologist with the Bureau of Fisheries, 
argued in 1921, “that the predatory fishes.. .constitute one of the most serious menaces facing the 
salmon industry,” specifically to hatchery-produced juveniles.18 In an effort to minimize predation 
on juvenile salmon in the Bristol Bay area, in 1921 alone roughly 10,000-13,000 Dolly Varden and 
rainbow trout were eradicated from the Wood River, and about 4,150-5,500 from the Naknek River. 
As efforts continued into the 1940s, the totals eliminated statewide climbed to the hundreds of 
thousands annually.19 The perceived success of these efforts was so great that Winn recommended
14 Millard C. Marsh, “The Fisheries of Alaska in 1907,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 
1907 and Special Papers, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), 1.
15 George M. Bowers, Report o f  the Commissioner o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 1907 and Special Papers, 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1907), 10.
16 Hugh M. Smith, “Alaska Fish and Fur Industries,” Report o f  the United States Commissioner o f  Fisheries 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), 35.
17 Dennis Winn, “Destruction of Predatory Fishes in Bristol Bay Region,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United 
States Bureau o f  Fisheries (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1922), 31-2.
18 Ibid, 37.
19 Ibid, 32-3. Though the number of fish eradicated is presented in pounds in the report, I divided the total weight 
provided (35,000-40,000 and 16,600 respectively) by the average weight of 3-4 pounds per fish. Ward T. Bower 
“Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industry in 1936,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States Bureau ofFisheries 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 7, “During the year [1936] 31,012 Dolly Vardens were
39
that predatory fish eradication be continued to the greatest extent possible.20 Well into the 1930s, 
the Territory of Alaska and cannery owners paid per-fish bounties totaling approximately $15,000 
annually for Dolly Varden to “bona fide residents of Alaska.”21 Eradication efforts benefitted can­
neries and provided income to Alaska residents.
The negative perception of Dolly Varden extended beyond the scientific community. In a 
statement similar to that of Winn, a contributor to the Petersburg Press (Alaska), wrote that “the 
Dolly Vardin [sic] trout is the most destructive enemy that the salmon has,” and portrayed Dolly 
Varden eradication as essential to ensuring future salmon runs.22 This sentiment persisted in 1936, 
as expressed in a letter from a Juneau attorney, Frank N. Foster, to Forest Ranger Wyckoff that ac­
companied a resolution to Congress requesting that the Alaska Game Commission be allowed to 
regulate and conserve game fish, except for Dolly Varden, which fed on salmon fry and spawn.23
By 1939, Commissioner Ward Bower declared that eradication efforts “resulted in a marked 
improvement in the runs of red salmon in the regions.”24 Predatory fish eradication programs ap­
peared to have immediate benefits; however, scientists failed to recognize the ecological benefits 
of Dolly Varden, and the benefits to salmon specifically. Juvenile salmon fed on the eggs of other 
resident fish; by eliminating such a large stock of eggs, managers reduced nutrients available to 
economically important species, such as salmon. Additionally, removal of predators left more juve­
niles in a particular area, which led to greater competition for resources. As the life histories show,
destroyed in the Yakutat district and 208,799 in the Cook Inlet district.”
20 Ibid, 37.
21 Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industry in 1934,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States 
Bureau o f  Fisheries (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1935), 2 and Ward T. Bower “Alaska Fishery 
and Fur-Seal Industry in 1935,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States Bureau o f  Fisheries (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), 7.
22 Jack Nelson, “Fifteen Years of Watching and Fishing the Dolly Vardin Trout in the Streams and Rivers Outside 
Points in Southeastern Alaska,” Petersburg Press (February 8, 1929).
23 “Conservation of Sport Fish Urged,” Petersburg Press (Petersburg, Alaska), March 6, 1936.
24 Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industries in 1938,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States 
Bureau o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 1939 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1940), 93.
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greater competition for fewer resources results in earlier smoltification, or the process of juvenile 
salmon becoming smolt and heading to the ocean. Consequently, the smolt were smaller and more 
vulnerable to the stresses of migration, competition from larger smolt originating in other rivers or 
streams, and marine predators, resulting in drainage specific population declines.25
Threats to target species extended beyond predatory fish to other species of salmon. Fish­
ermen were encouraged to remove the threat of competition to preferred salmon species, which 
included chum, coho, and pink salmon, to promote the runs of the prized Chinook and Sockeye, or 
redfish. In 1913, Hugh Smith noted a significant increase in Sockeye and Chinook populations which 
“ow[ed] largely to the great increase in the catch of cheaper grades of salmon.”26 This development, 
along with the belief that predatory fish were one of the greatest threats to salmon, demonstrated 
a significant ecological misunderstanding. The misunderstanding lay not in willful ignorance, but 
was based on limited comprehension of salmon biology and in widely held ecological beliefs about 
predator/prey relationships.
Today scientists recognize a number of variables involved in salmon population abundances, 
but federal managers in the first half of the twentieth century thought more of simple causal relation­
ships. Perceptions of simple relationships stemmed in part from limited ecological knowledge, and 
scientists often relied on a single data source to gauge success: the yields in the salmon industry. 
Commercial harvest reports served as the sole mode of salmon population data collection well 
into the twentieth century. As Malcolm Haddon, Senior Fisheries Modeller at Australia’s Com­
monwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation noted, “ . i t  was at least three decades 
into the twentieth century before mathematical treatments of aspects other than simple summaries
25 Thomas P. Quinn.
26 Hugh M Smith, “Alaska Fish and Fur Industries,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States Bureau o f  
Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 1913 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1914), 34.
41
of catch-per-unit-effort were considered.”27 While useful, the data set is problematic when used 
without supplementary data collection.
Of course, the economic value of salmon, rather than overall ecological health, was the pri­
mary motivation for conserving the resource, a view emphasized by a correspondent for the Rogue 
River Courier that salmon were “valued for their economic worth only.”28 And because it was be­
lieved that the populations could be manipulated by adding more fish via hatcheries, or eliminating 
a single environmental factor such as predators, other environmental components were overlooked. 
Over time, however, as conservation science and salmon science became more sophisticated, federal 
management would consider other strategies.
2.5 Escapement-Based Management
A third effort to control salmon populations looked at escapement-based management strate­
gies. Scientists understood the value of allowing salmon to return to their native spawning grounds, 
but primarily as a function of propagation. In the 1914 Bureau of Fisheries Report, Ward T. Bower 
emphasized the benefits of closing certain rivers and streams completely to commercial fishing. “One 
of the best methods of a meeting a threatened decrease in the supply of salmon,” Bower argued, “is 
by closing streams or waters to commercial fishing, so that the natural spawning grounds will not 
be disturbed or encroached upon by fishermen.”29 Closures lasted for days, months, and even years 
depending on the severity of the circumstances. While managers throughout the twentieth century, 
and even today, use similar closure systems, the later systems have been much more dynamic, and 
have relied less on subjective observation and limited data and more on comprehensive model­
27 Malcolm Haddon, 2.
28 “Ashland and the Fish Question,” Rogue River Courier Daily Edition (Grants Pass, Oregon), January 2, 1917, 2.
29 Ward T. Bower and Henry D. Aller, “Alaska Fisheries and Fur Industries in 1914,” Report o f  the United States 
Commissioner o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 1914 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1915), 8.
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ing methods that account for a variety of human and non-human factors. Instead of the periodic, 
escapement-based closures practiced today, managers in the early twentieth century relied on ex­
tended closures that eliminated commercial fishing opportunity. Though the managerial decisions 
were influenced heavily by the scientific knowledge of the time, fishermen who witnessed rotting 
salmon corpses along the riverbank had difficulty coming to terms with what they saw as waste.
Commercial fishermen saw prolonged closures as both ecologically and economically 
damaging. A reporter with The Seattle Star described “the yearly tragedy of the salmon run.”30 
He declared: “were it not for the annual catch a disastrous waste would occur.” He reasoned that 
since “the laws of nature have doomed it to die when the season of propagation is at an end.. .the 
capture of salmon under conservative regulations fits in quite happily with nature’s scheme.”31 
This position not only demonstrated a limited understanding of salmon biology and ecology, but 
of “nature’s scheme.”
In 1915, residents who lived near Oregon’s Rogue River experienced the type of river clo­
sure described by Bower for two years. Commercial fishing was suspended with the hope that the 
salmon run would return to its former abundance. Commercial fishermen and residents watched 
as salmon filled the Rogue River, spawned, and died. One correspondent with the Rogue River 
Courier demanded “the right of the people to use the salmon upon the table instead of allowing the 
fish to rot upon the banks of the river.”32 Fishery biologists know today that salmon serve a vital 
function in riverine ecosystems and that these rotting corpses are crucial to maintaining a healthy 
environment, but to commercial fishermen who understood little about these ecosystems, the rotting
30 “Seattle Fishermen Sail Forth to Meet Salmon on Their Annual Pilgrimage,” The Seattle Star (Seattle, Washington), 
July 6, 1914, 3.
31 Ibid.
32 “Ashland and the Fish Question.”
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fish represented waste and a negative profit margin.
The value of dead salmon to an ecosystem may not have been thoroughly understood, but 
an inkling of their value was recognized by sport fishermen. An unnamed contributor to the Rogue 
River Courier described the effects of closing the Rogue River to commercial fishing, and the influx 
of salmon into the system. He observed “the steelheads, the sport fish of the stream, feeding upon 
the spawn of the salmon and upon the decaying flesh of the dead sa lm o n .”33 Though he did not 
connect all the dots, this recreational fisherman described a critical function of salmon: delivering 
marine derived nutrients to an inland riverine ecosystem.
This availability of food for the steelhead meant that they were not interested in rising to 
a fly and were almost impossible to catch by sport fishermen. To recreational outdoorsmen, dead 
salmon ruined the sport fishing experience. “The poorest sport fishing ever had in the Rogue,” 
the contributor complained, “was upon the two years when the stream was closed to all forms of 
commercial fishing.”34 Salmon numbers were so vast that resident species did not need to look far 
for food. Supporting the argument presented by previous contributors, this fisherman concluded, 
“properly regulated commercial fishing not only saves to the people the food value of the [salm on]. 
but.im proves the sport fishing as well.”35 Fundamentally, the contributor urged an exploitative 
salmon conservation program because, in the words of ecologist Aldo Leopold, “the wild things he 
[fished] for [had] eluded his grasp, and he hope[d] by some necromancy of laws, appropriations, 
regional plans, reorganization of departments, or other form of mass-wishing to make them [easier 
to catch].”36
33 “Grants Pass and the Rogue Fish Question,” Rogue River Courier Daily Edition (Grants Pass, Oregon) January 2, 
1917, 1.
34 Ibid .
35 Ibid.
36 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949).
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Limiting marine derived nutrients to a riverine ecosystem had a compound effect on salmon 
runs. Not only were commercial fishermen limiting the number of adults returning to spawn, which 
resulted in fewer offspring, but the juvenile salmon born the year before depended on the eggs from 
spawning salmon and the flesh of salmon carcasses for nutrients. By encouraging commercial harvest 
to deprive the sport fish of nutrients, forcing them to find food elsewhere (thus making them more 
likely to bite artificial lures), the Rogue River Courier contributor was also unknowingly recom­
mending depriving juvenile salmon of the same nutrients.
Interestingly, river closures were not accompanied by estuarine fishing closures, which 
sparked heated preferential treatment debates throughout the twentieth century. This raised a man­
agement concern: while managers closed fishing completely in the river itself, commercial fishermen 
could still harvest salmon in the estuarine environment in the vicinity of the closed river. In fact, 
some industrious fishermen would spook salmon back down river by various means such as nets, 
noise, or simply fishermen methodically walking in a line downstream to the estuary where they 
harvested the fish legally.37 Though the practice of closing rivers but not their estuaries was internally 
inconsistent, ecological and population related information was sparse, and the contradiction was 
overlooked. Conservationists still saw the ocean as an infinite resource base, and an observation- 
based management system required, by definition, collection of observable data.
Not only do the various components of this example demonstrate early conservationists’ 
emphasis on resource use, but they also highlight incongruities in human responses to management 
decisions. Commercial fishermen viewed such management inconsistencies as evidence of incom­
petency. Yet people who depended on the resource often had unrealistic expectations of scientists 
and managers. Scientists were expected to allow just the right number of salmon to return to the
37 Ward T. Bower and Henry D. Aller.
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spawning grounds; any more and the salmon were wasted, any less and there would not be enough 
salmon to ensure future runs. Fishermen asserted that “properly regulated commercial fishing,” 
and “conservative regulations” would ensure future salmon runs. Yet science was not capable of 
enabling a successful industry based on conservative regulations alone. Although managers at­
tempted to reconcile economic imperatives with ecological health, they lacked the tools to do so.
Furthermore, tactics such as hatcheries, predator eradication, and stream closures did not 
account for the complexity and variability of salmon stocks or the larger ecosystem they occupied. 
While periodic use of these measures proved effective for long-lived species like rockfish, cod, or 
halibut, salmon life histories made these strategies both economically and ecologically impracti­
cal, and in most cases counterproductive because they threatened future runs. With the inability 
to estimate salmon population numbers accurately, or predict future population functions, salmon 
biologists and managers were ill-equipped to implement escapement-based management strategies. 
Thus during the first decades of the twentieth century, federal management was bound to experi­
ence uneven outcomes.
2.6 E.S. Russell, Quantitative Modeling, and Ecology
By the late 1920s, more and more managers and scientists recognized the shortcomings 
of their efforts. U.S. Bureau of Fisheries Commissioner Hugh Smith urged “radical revision” of 
current salmon regulation owing to dwindling salmon runs that would be the worst on record two 
years later. 38 Scientists may have been overreaching when they stated that salmon were “at the 
most critical period of their history,” but it was nevertheless true that the fisheries remained “sub­
38 Hugh M. Smith, “Alaska Fisheries Service,” Report o f  the United States Commissioner o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal 
Year 1919 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1920), 49.
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ject to laws which [had] been shown to be obsolete and inadequate.”39 Legislation was not merely 
“obsolete and inadequate;” it asked the impossible. Scientists lacked the technology and modeling 
techniques to quantify salmon stocks, thus they could not keep up with economic demands and 
legislative decisions.40
The methods for controlling the dynamic and complex salmon fishery had yet to be devel­
oped.. Salmon life history-specific management required accurate population estimates, and an 
escapement-based management system. Yet, until the 1930s, scientists could rely on little more than 
speculation and wishful thinking, a conservation strategy that Alaska’s territorial governor Ernest 
Gruening years later said was “by guess and by God.”41 This is not to suggest that experiments were 
not undertaken, substantial data was not collected, or that efforts were totally misguided. Managers 
simply could not interpret the vast amount of information they collected. Industrial salmon harvest­
ing required vastly different management strategies than earlier fisheries. The first step towards 
more sophisticated fisheries management, that sought to incorporate multiple factors, came in 1931 
when Edward Stuart (E. S.) Russell, a biologist and ecologist with the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries in London, sought to explain mathematically the “overfishing problem.”42
Though inadequate by today’s standards, Russell’s equation for estimating total biomass of a 
fishery laid the foundation of a new era in fisheries management. For the first time, a mathematical 
equation made population modeling possible. As Malcolm Haddon explained, Russell’s equation did 
not account for “the effects of other species (competitors, predators, etc.), the physical environment
39 Ibid.
40 E. A. Fulton, A. D. M. Smith, and A. E. Punt, “Which ecological indicators can robustly detect effects of 
fishing?” ICES Journal o f  Marine Science 62 (2005), 540-51 as quoted in Malcolm Haddon, 3. Exact quote reads: 
“Unfortunately, the legislation requiring such evaluation has developed ahead of the science needed to provide 
appropriate assessments.”
41 Ernest Gruening, The State o f  Alaska  (New York: Random House, 1968), 401.
42 Edward Stuart (E. S.) Russell, The Overfishing Problem (University Press, 1942).
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in which the species lived, which can include everything from El Nino effects to pollution stress, 
and special structuring of the fished stock,” yet Russell’s biomass equation marked a substantial 
turning point in fisheries management. 43
Of Russell’s many contributions to the field, perhaps one of his greatest was his holistic 
understanding of fisheries that incorporated the idea of salmon population dynamics as part of a 
wider eco-system. As he noted, “from the point of view of a rational classification of the sciences 
fishery research is, by reason of its methods and standpoint, simply a branch of ecology.”44 Rus­
sell contextualized fisheries science with something other than simple equations. “The sea and its 
problems are one,” he argued, “what happens in one little corner cannot be interpreted without 
reference to what is going on elsewhere; what happens in [one location], for instance, depends to a 
large extent upon the set of currents, and they in their turn are linked up with a general circulation 
of waters.”45 Based on Russell’s insight, management shifted from locally exclusive models to re­
gionally inclusive endeavors. Russell’s insight would help scientists and managers understand the 
natural world, but would also introduce new questions that demanded answers. Though Russell’s 
biomass equation and ecological argument were in their infancy and not universally accepted at 
the time, they demonstrated a new conceptual framework to interpret the natural world that offered 
the possibility of reconciling economic opportunity and ecological necessity with a new degree of 
precision.
Federal management slowly incorporated more ecologically- minded strategies, and the 1930s 
became a transition period when managers slowly discarded older techniques for newer measures. 
However, conservation strategies often developed ahead of the technological and scientific data
43 Malcolm Haddon, 3.
44 E. S. Russell, “Fishery Research: Its Contribution to Ecology,” Journal o f  Ecology 20, No. 1 (Feb. 1932), 128.
45 Ibid, 129.
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collection methods required to implement them, or else were put in place alongside older methods. 
Practices such as predatory fish eradication and extended river closures continued, even as scientists 
and managers understood new methodologies grounded in more complex understandings of ecology.
Prior to 1931, escapement-based management was often overly optimistic. Escapement 
goals of 50 percent were common, but early managers had no way to determine population size 
aside from catch-per-unit-effort data.46 In short, they did not know, nor did they have an effective 
way to estimate, total numbers of salmon. Fifty percent was an arbitrary target because managers 
could boast meeting escapement goals without knowing the number of salmon that equaled 50 
percent of the run!
While catch-per-unit-effort data helps determine population size, and remains in use today, it 
plays just one part in a complex equation. On their own, these statistics provide limited information, 
and are highly variable depending on capture efficiency, location, equipment type, etc. However, 
Russell’s biomass equation introduced in 1931 allowed managers to estimate total run numbers and 
adjust escapement goals based on specific stocks.
The next steps towards a better ecological understanding of salmon came three years after 
Russell’s fisheries ecology argument surfaced. Salmon biologists began noticing trends relative to 
environmental conditions. In 1935 -  coincidentally the same year that the Alaska Legislature passed 
an act that created an Alaskan advisory committee tasked with supplementing federal scientific efforts 
-  biologists, in a groundbreaking study, tried to evaluate how natural factors affected each year’s 
runs.47 A number of substantial developments in salmon management resulted: the identification
46 “Alaska Fisheries Service,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States Bureau o f  Fisheries (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1936), 99 stated, “a consistent program has been followed, the main objective of 
which is to assure an adequate escapement of brood fish to maintain a maximum supply. A breeding reserve of 50 
percent of the salmon runs is regarded as the minimum requirement.” Though, as mentioned in the main text, scientists 
were unsure of the number to take 50 percent of to ensure maximum sustained yield.
47 Ward T. Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industry in 1935,” Report o f  the Commissioner o f  the United States
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of several natural factors, the evaluation of those factors, and the first truly proactive management 
strategy was sought that would incorporate these estimates ahead of making management decisions 
rather than reacting to population declines through more traditional methods.
In two separate locations within the Territory of Alaska researchers discovered indications 
that changes in natural conditions in which young fish develop greatly influence salmon popula­
tion abundance.48 Managers and scientists now recognized that salmon management started at the 
juvenile stage, not the adult stage. By understanding the conditions that affect juvenile salmon, 
salmon conservationists were able to better understand population dynamics. In combination with 
Russell’s relatively new biomass equation, scientists could more accurately predict future salmon 
runs, the key to effective salmon management.
The third, and probably most significant result of this 1935 study was the identification of 
natural population fluctuation. For the first time in the history of salmon management, scientists 
understood fluctuation to be, at least in part, a natural occurrence rather than based only on human 
take. In 1935, armed with an enlightened ecological understanding and new methods of analyzing 
data, fisheries scientists began to study daily catch records, seeking primarily to determine periodic 
changes in abundance and run timing.49
Over the following two decades, scientists made significant breakthroughs in understanding 
Pacific salmon life history, ecology, and population dynamics. Fluctuations that had been deemed 
unnatural only a few years earlier began to be accepted as part of population cycles. Understanding 
both natural and human forces in the cycles was critical to establishing effective regulations for the
Bureau o f  Fisheries fo r  the Fiscal Year 1936 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1937), 11, and Ward T. 
Bower, “Alaska Fishery and Fur-Seal Industry in 1935,” 17.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
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conservation of salmon.50 Salmon conservationists realized that salmon life histories required specific 
management strategies, and that to utilize the run effectively for commercial harvest while ensuring 
future runs, a much more dynamic, proactive management strategy was required.51 These changes 
were not solely the direct result of Russell’s work; as Russell himself argued, no phenomena exist 
in isolation. However, it is fair to state that the shift reflected what Russell’s work embodied: a more 
informed approach that recognized the interconnectedness of human and environmental factors.
2.7 Conclusion
Pacific salmon conservation efforts during the federal era of management underwent many 
changes. Although the fundamental role of the federal fishery manager during the early twentieth 
century, just as it is today, was to reconcile political, cultural, and economic desires with biologi­
cal realities, tactics shifted over time in response to economic pressure and growing ecological 
understanding. Hatcheries, predator fish eradication, and the development of an escapement-based 
management system offered three examples of management policies under these conditions. Im­
portantly, before Russell, and the growing acceptance of eco-system, rather than species-specific 
management, the lack of quantitative precision resulted in strategies that often favored economic 
goals over biological concerns. By the mid-twentieth century, technology enabled increased pre­
cision in fishery management, and when combined with quantitative modeling allowed for more 
informed management directives.
Simultaneously, while the value of salmon remained largely economic, it also accrued 
ideological importance. As addressed in the next chapter, Alaskans targeted federal mismanagement 
and blamed outsiders for declining populations. In this way, political, cultural, and economic pres-
50 Ibid.
51 See Malcolm Haddon quote on page 5.
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sure would all come into play in the transition to statehood and how the state would regulate its 
fishing industry.
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Chapter 3 Transition to Statehood and State Management
3.1 Introduction
In the decades leading to statehood, a small but growing number of Alaskans urged greater 
local control of the fishing industry, a goal that would be achieved in 1959. However, for managers, 
the two-decades from 1940 to 1960 were a frustrating period in federal salmon policy. Increasing 
ecological understanding accompanied progressive fishery legislation. Yet the technological ability 
to effectively implement these ambitious policies remained out of reach. Complicating the situa­
tion, as support for Alaskan statehood grew, anti-federal salmon rhetoric hindered federal managers 
and policymakers alike. Federal attempts to manage the resource were seen as affronts to territorial 
sovereignty. Eventually, federal managers would be disempowered when the state took over, and 
new regulations would be written into the state constitution.
3.2 The 1940s -  Increased Analytical Sophistication in Salmon Management
World War II interrupted the momentum of fisheries and scientific advancement. The salmon 
fishery continued on a limited scale, however scientific study was essentially suspended during the 
war.1 This was due largely to the loss of government allocations for fisheries research, and the dif­
ficulty of recruiting qualified personnel to conduct research in Alaska, because their abilities were 
required by the military or foreign services.2 In 1945, as the war wound down, the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service resumed limited studies and were back to full steam by 1947.
Fishery science at this time was largely motivated by salmon industry objectives., As U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Director Albert M. Day noted, “little opportunity [was] afforded for work in
1 Albert M. Day, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Division o f  Fishery Biology Annual Report fo r  the Fiscal 
Year 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1947).
2 Ibid, 2.
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the developmental field or in the fundamental field of pure science.”3 Nevertheless, the U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service conducted studies of salmon “of the highest theoretical importance.”4 Day 
understood that practical understanding of salmon biology and ecology would encourage further 
development within the scientific fields. “The purpose kept in mind,” Day argued, “is the discovery 
and development of means and systems of managing fishery resources to assure their complete 
utilization and permanent productivity.”5
Hidden in Day’s language was the theoretical precursor of what is today called maximum 
sustained yield. “Complete utilization and permanent productivity” demonstrated a sophisticated 
concept of natural resource management that was a step towards reconciling economic demand with 
ecological sustainability. Maximum sustained yield is the maximum amount of a biotic community 
that can be taken while maintaining the long-term viability of the population. Though the concept 
represented a best-case scenario and demanded scientific precision that was impossible at the time, 
the idea incorporated a much more responsive management approach than that of earlier decades. 
It acknowledged that in order to manage a fluctuating, abundant fishery, management regimes had 
to reflect elasticity and developments in the scientific understanding of Pacific salmon life histories, 
population dynamics, and ecology.
For instance, managers and scientists in the 1940s realized that simple catch-per-unit-effort 
data was not sufficient for accurate population estimates and did not reflect the complexity of salmon 
population dynamics. Substantive claims regarding salmon runs required multi-source data compila­
tion such as fishing intensity, preceding population abundances, escapement, and age composition. 
By 1947, scientists were able to make simple predictions regarding salmon runs and, with the help
3 Ibid, 3.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid, 4.
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of fishing effort data, could determine the fishing pressure that the runs could maintain.6
Sophisticated management practices resulted from increased biological understanding with 
new sampling and analytical capabilities, but one of the most significant developments was the 
inclusion of ecological breadth into regional fisheries. In March of 1952, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service consolidated California, Oregon, and Washington, and Alaska to create a single Pacific 
Salmon Investigation. While territorial representatives who disfavored federal management of Alas­
kan salmon fisheries saw the gesture as a form of neglect, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Director, 
John L. Farley provided a much more practical, ecologically based rationale for the consolidation: 
“since a single service unit handles all Pacific salmon research, similarities and differences in form, 
in migratory and spawning habits, in reaction to environment, and in mortality factors between 
many individual stocks are more easily detected and understood than they would be with several 
small units.”7 This idea harkens back to Russell’s 1932 argument that the ocean does not consist of 
isolated regions, but is a collective unit, and one cannot understand one area without understanding 
adjacent regions. He demonstrated that an understanding of ecology is essential for fishery biologists.
The new emphasis on ecological context gave rise to a conservation ideology that would 
influence future perceptions of natural resource development, but that would not always be put 
into practice. In 1949, with the publication of ecologist Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac, 
the idea of ecological responsibility and the necessity of a land ethic became more well-known. 
He stated that ethics rests on the premise that “the individual is a member of a community of in­
terdependent parts...the land ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the community” to include
6 Ibid.
7 Albert M. Day, “Pacific Salmon Investigations,” Branch o f  Fishery Biology Annual Report fo r  the Fiscal Year 
1952, Washington, D.C. (October 1952), 26 and John L. Farley, “Pacific Salmon Investigations,” Branch o f  Fishery 
Biology Annual Report fo r  the Fiscal Year 1954, Washington, D.C. (October 1954), 44.
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the natural world.8 Leopold’s ideology tied together key themes that related to fishery science and 
argued for an ecologically-based paradigm that would come to influence resource management 
more and more in the post-War period.
Ecological contextualization of biotic communities demonstrated sophisticated interpreta­
tions of the natural world. The overall health of the environment was accorded value beyond the 
marketplace. Thinking about the natural world as consisting of an intricate web of interconnected 
parts made each member of that community integral to the well being of the whole. For instance, 
managers began to comprehend the environmental harm caused by predator eradication programs. 
In a 1937 letter to T.D. Peffley, Aldo Leopold insisted that game managers now saw “vermin 
campaigns,” like those targeting Dolly Varden in the early twentieth century, as “not only useless, 
but actually harmful to conservation.”9 Scientists recognized predator species like Dolly Varden 
as providing an ecological service instead of a disservice. Leopold explained the ecosystem as an 
ecological pyramid comprised of various layers of the biotic community: the top layer represented 
the apex predators, the layer below them their prey, the layer below that the prey of the prey, etc. 
He noted that “the pyramid is a tangle of chains so complex as to seem disorderly, yet the stability 
of the system proves it to be a highly organized structure,” and to remove a predator like the Dolly 
Varden would disrupt the entire system.10 “It is only in recent years that we hear the more honest 
argument that predators are members of the community,” Leopold noted, “and that no special interest 
has the right to exterminate them for the sake of a benefit, real or fancied, to itself.”11 Yet he also 
observed that, “this enlightened view [was] still in the talk stage,” and “the extermination of predators
8 Aldo Leopold, 204.
9 Aldo Leopold, “Letter to T.D. Peffley,” in A Sand County Almanac & Other Writings on Ecology and Conservation.
10 Ibid, 253-4.
11 Ibid, 247.
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[went] merrily on.”12 Indeed, Leopold’s perception of predators as important members of a much 
larger, more intricate biotic community was still more ideology than policy put into practice. Thus, 
despite the growing acceptance of ecologically driven views like that of Leopold, Alaska salmon 
management regimes were slow to respond largely due to economic demands placed on the industry.
Furthermore, even though models had been developed to represent salmon populations 
and help scientists determine abundances, escapements, and run forecasts, computer-modeling 
capabilities of the time remained unsophisticated. Computers were rudimentary machines in the 
early 1950s, capable of little more than basic mathematics. Scientists and statisticians used dif­
ferential calculus to create simplistic models to represent the natural world. As Malcolm Haddon 
observed, without the help of computers that later modelers relied on, parts of the model structures 
“were determined more by what could be solved analytically than because they reflected nature in 
a particularly accurate manner.”13
Biological and ecological information that grounded salmon management had begun to 
change. Yet scientists and managers in the 1940s and 1950s were still tethered to outdated manage­
ment strategies and by the inability to model dynamic populations. Thus they continued to carry out 
many of their conservation efforts based on earlier methods. The salmon collapse experienced in 
the late 1940s until the mid 1950s (discussed below), then, was arguably not the result of scientific 
incompetence, but the perfect storm of biological, ecological, and environmental factors magnified 
by a management system unable to carry out more enlightened scientific ambitions.
In 1949, only two years after the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service had resumed normal 
salmon research in Alaska, a cadre of territorial leaders became increasingly vocal against federal
12 Ibid.
13 Malcolm Haddon, 13.
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management. Alaskans, such as Governor Ernest Gruening, believed that “like the mastodon,” 
government conservation had “become handicapped by its own dimensions.”14 To justify territorial 
participation in the Alaska salmon management arena, Gruening pointed to the federal managers’ 
“inability to carry out not only the primary conservation function but to understand and satisfy the 
important social and economic implications of the task.”15 That year the Territorial Legislature de­
veloped the Alaska Department of Fisheries to assist in conservation and management decisions to 
ensure future salmon runs, promote the ownership and management of fisheries by Alaska residents, 
and work alongside the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service. Gruening, however, overestimated the role 
territorial fishery managers would play. Though the territory established the Alaska Department 
of Fisheries to prepare for Alaska’s taking control of the salmon resource from the Department of 
the Interior upon statehood, the department served little more purpose than symbolically asserting 
territorial sovereignty.16 Legislative efforts to take control of Alaska’s resource remained stymied, 
and territorial fisheries managers had no real authority.
3.3 The 1950s Salmon Population Collapse
By 1953, the commercial salmon harvest had reached a thirty-two year low.17 The popula­
tion collapse of the 1950s lasted roughly a decade and was the bottom end of a gradually declining 
commercial salmon harvest starting in 1937, which marked the greatest harvest year under federal 
management valued at over $500 million. Coincidentally, 1960 marked the lowest commercial 
salmon harvest since the early twentieth century, worth roughly $100 million. That same year, 
Alaska salmon management authority was transferred to the Alaska Department of Fish & Game.
14 Aldo Leopold.
15 Ernest Gruening, The State o f  Alaska  (New York: Random House, 1968), 406.
16 Ibid.
17 The lowest since 1911, excepting 1921.
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The dramatic increase in commercial harvest in the following years can be attributed both to salmon 
abundances and the implementation of a completely open access fishery. This system, while lucra­
tive in the short term, proved unsustainable.
The collapse that occurred in less than a decade prompted federal action. That year, President 
Eisenhower declared the Alaska salmon industry a “disaster area.” As Gruening pointed out, “des­
ignation of a ‘disaster area’ by the federal government customarily followed [a natural disaster]. 
usually referred to as an ‘act of God.’” What made this “disaster area” unique was that, according 
to Gruening, the salmon collapse was far from an act of God; this was a “failure of a federally man­
aged resource, attributable, rather, to the acts of man.”18 This diagnosis, however, was a simplified 
rendering of a complex ecological phenomenon. The naturally fluctuating population abundances of 
Pacific salmon relative to environmental conditions may have been exaggerated by acts of man, but 
also were undoubtedly products of the natural world.19 However, the collapse served to reinforce 
Gruening’s argument for statehood -  a move he saw as imperative in order to rescue Alaska from 
its subordinate status and save the industry from outsiders.20 In particular, industrial methods of 
capturing salmon, in the form of fish traps, became a powerful example of “colonial” oppression 
used by proponents of statehood to rally support.
3.4 Fish Traps and Alaskan Political Culture
James Mackovjak’s study Alaska Salmon Traps provides a nuts-and-bolts understanding of 
the industrial fish traps themselves.21 Mackovjak stated that there have historically been two types 
of fish traps: fixed and floating. Both are comprised of basic components including a lead, which
18 Ernest Gruening, 405.
19 All quotations from Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 James Mackovjak, Alaska Salmon Traps (Gustavus: Cross Sound Innovations, 2013).
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extends from shore out into an estuary about 600 feet, where the main body of the trap is stationed. 
The main body consists of hearts (pens in the shape of a heart with straight edges with the pointed 
end creating an opening to another heart or the holding pens), and the number of hearts depends 
on the trap, but most traps consist of an inner and outer heart. The hearts act as funnels that both 
force salmon to continue to the holding pens and prevent their escape. The holding pen is the last 
segment of the trap and farthest from shore. It is from this point that the salmon are loaded onto 
boats and brought to sale. It is as simple a capture method as could be designed, and, in the words 
of their opponents, operated with “brutal efficiency.”22 The only difference between fixed and float­
ing traps was that fixed traps were made up of long poles driven into the ocean floor and required 
significant energy and capital to assemble at the beginning of the season and disassemble at the 
end. This early, costly method soon gave way to the then-modern, economically efficient floating 
traps that were fixed using cables with anchors. At the end of the season, the anchors were weighed 
and the traps were simply pulled to their overwintering site in a nearby bay or other protected area.
Fish traps were more efficient than any other harvest method. They required little effort to 
operate once established, and the salmon literally swam right into them. Salmon migrating along 
the coast happened upon the lead and, when confronted with the obstacle, the salmon followed 
the net to find an alternate route, swimming into the first heart where they were trapped. Unable 
to swim back the direction they came, they continued on to the second heart, and farther still to 
the holding pen where they stayed until the commercial boat loaded them using a specialized net 
called a “brailer.”23
Fish trap operators started each season scouting for prime real estate where they would spend
22 Steve Colt, “Salmon Fish Traps in Alaska,” Institute o f  Social and Economic Research (Anchorage: University of 
Alaska Anchorage, 1999), 12.
23 James Mackovjak, 4.
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their summer. Despite the apparent ease of fish trap success as described by anti-trap advocates 
in the 1950s, the capture method was disadvantaged in their immobility. They were bound by the 
three fundamental rules of real estate: location, location, and location. In his work titled The Alaska 
Salmon Trap: Its Evolution, Conflicts, and Consequences, H.C. Scudder stated that “a matter of a 
few feet in the location of the tailhold could mean the difference between success and failure.”24 
The successful placement of a fish trap would largely have been associated with favorable ocean 
currents and the distance and direction the freshwater was traveling once it contacted the ocean. 
To be sure, the direction and presence of freshwater slicks in an estuary would dictate migration 
patterns of the salmon returning to spawn.
Once salmon have traveled hundreds or possibly thousands of miles through the open ocean, 
and are within a certain distance of their natal streams, the scent of fresh water takes over as their 
primary navigational tool. Salmon have the remarkable ability of being able to follow the scent of 
their specific drainage to its mouth. Research has shown that smell is such a strong navigational 
tool that it influences salmon behavior.25
24 H.C. Scudder, The Alaska Salmon Trap: Its Evolution, Conflicts, and Consequences (Anchorage: Alaska State 
Library Historical Monograph Series, 1970) as quoted in Steve Colt, 10.
25 Thomas P. Quinn, “Migrations in Coastal and Estuarine Waters,” The Behavior and Ecology o f  Pacific Salmon 
& Trout (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 63-65. Once salmon start to catch the scent of fresh water 
in the ocean their travel patterns have a much more significant vertical component, sometimes traveling hundreds of 
feet in the water column, swimming from depths of hundred o f feet to about 10-15 feet (or shallower), only to almost 
immediately descend again. Biologist Thomas Quinn tried to make sense of this seemingly erratic travel behavior. 
While one possible reason would be to feed, a much more plausible explanation is the navigational component. As 
the warmer water from the rivers enters the ocean, a natural separation occurs: the warmer, fresh water stays towards 
the surface, and the cold ocean water stays below. The first whiff o f fresh water scent could be at a slightly greater 
depth the farther away from the river the salmon is, simply because the warmer, fresh water and colder, salt water have 
had more time to mix. But as the salmon close in on their natal river systems, the fresh water and salt water become 
more distinct, creating a more defined layer as they travel closer. This would explain why salmon would be found 
in shallower water as they near their natal rivers, but it does not account for the bizarre behavior of traveling such 
great distances in the water column. The reason exemplifies the power of smell as a navigational tool; the salmon are 
enhancing the smell o f fresh water, and thus are able to precisely identify their specific river among the others. In 
order for salmon to isolate the smell of their target river, they have to enhance their ability to differentiate between the 
plethora of freshwater sources. An example used by Thomas Quinn is that the smell o f a bakery is much more powerful 
when you first walk in the door than if you have been there for any amount of time. Same with salmon, the smell is 
more powerful if  they are constantly being re-exposed to the scent of the stream to which they are navigating than if
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Understanding that scent is the primary navigation tool of salmon once they are within 
smelling distance of their river helps clarify why fish trap location is so important. Where the river 
and ocean meet -  the river delta -there is very little mixing of fresh and salt water. The river flows 
unopposed mostly for its entire length until it hits the wall that is the ocean. The energy produced 
by the rushing water is suddenly met by the energy of the ocean, and when two opposing forces 
collide the results can be dynamic. The fresh water, instead of continuing in a straight line out into 
the ocean, is diverted and continues near-shore gradually mixing with the ocean. This phenomenon 
creates a near-shore freshwater scent trail that extends for miles. Salmon, following the scent to 
their river, will travel the last leg of their marine journey relatively close to shore where the scent 
of the river is strongest. Fish traps, with their leads extending out hundreds of feet from shore, lay 
directly in the path of migrating salmon. However, prevailing ocean currents, river velocity, and 
ocean temperature would all have played a role in precisely how successful a trap was. Salmon 
generally follow the strongest scent trail back to the river, and placing a trap outside of that stream 
would have yielded marginal success. The most profitable fish traps would have lain -  however 
unknowingly -  in the path of the strongest freshwater slick. Thus, as verified in H.C. Scudder’s 
account, a matter of feet could be the difference between success and failure.
However efficient they were, fish traps came to symbolize something much more sinister 
for statehood advocates. Fish traps, during the years of federal management, were primarily owned 
by canneries, which were owned by outsiders. Alaska fishermen and many Alaskans in general 
identified them as an emblem of federal oppression of Alaska’s then-most profitable resource. 26 In 
1954, Ernest Gruening stated, “transfer of the fisheries to Alaska would spell the banishment of the
they simply traveling in the portion of the water column that is higher proportion of fresh water. Smell, quite simply, 
is such a vital navigational tool that it influences salmon behavior.
26 Ernest Gruening.
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fish traps by its people,” who would then be “set free.” 27 Another anti-trap politician said that fish 
traps were the “most murderous and iniquitous instruments that ever were devised by the human 
brain to destroy natural life.”28 This emotionally charged language was common regarding fish 
traps. However the arguments opposing their use were based more on what fish traps represented 
than fish traps themselves. Fish traps were a symbol of federal mismanagement, encroachment of 
outside industry into Alaska’s resources, and the establishment of a property-rights-based commer­
cial fishery. These concepts clashed with notions of open access for all to Alaska’s resources -  a 
stance popular with residents.
The territory of Alaska had long opposed federal attempts to limit entry into Alaskan fisheries, 
believing that the federal government did not have the authority to tell them whether they could or 
could not fish. While the open access fishery stayed relatively intact during the federal tenure, fish 
traps came to represent an attempt to create private property in the ocean. Though there were never 
explicit property rights, the presence of fish traps certainly implied such rights. . Fish traps, being 
fixed throughout the season, made it impossible for the seiners to work around them. In fact, there 
were laws provisioning a 300 foot berth around fish traps where commercial fishing vessels were not 
allowed to operate, creating exclusive fishing zones. This, many Alaskans pointed out, established 
exclusive rights to the resource. The federal mandate supporting such exclusivity became a serious 
point of contention. Many like Ira N. Gabrielson of the Alaska Territorial Department of Fisheries 
believed that no one was “entitled to a vested right to a natural resource.”29
Vic Fischer, delegate to the Alaska constitutional convention recounted, “the use of traps 
to catch salmon had been a gut issue that energized the fight for statehood, traps being the ultimate
27 Ibid, 407.
28 Congressman William Sulzer, as quoted in Alaska Salmon Traps.
29 As quoted in State o f  Alaska, 394.
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symbol of the absentee cannery owners who were responsible for devastating the territory’s fisher­
ies and impoverishing coastal communities.”30 Gruening also acknowledged their symbolic role 
in establishing statehood: “ . t h e  issue of fish traps -  the territory’s most visible psychological and 
physical symbol of outside control -  descended as a legacy of territorial history.”31 Indeed, Alas­
kans in general, not just the commercial fishermen, took up arms against the despised fish traps, 
and sought to end the traps’ “reign of terror.”
Alaskan economist George Rogers argued that the “anti-trap case ha[d] been emotionally 
distorted to the point where even Alaskans who have never seen one would readily brand them 
as ‘fish killers’ and look upon them as the very embodiment of evil in this world.”32 Economist 
James Crutchfield verified Rogers claims: “The years of discrimination and political frustration led 
Alaskans to articulate the question of control of the fisheries on a straight ‘we-they’ basis that left 
little room for rational discussion of the biological and economic complexities of the resource and 
the industry.”33 Indeed, the Alaska salmon fishery had become a political hot button issue, and the 
emotionally charged rhetoric used by statehood advocates left little room for discussion regarding 
alternate fish trap implementation methods.
30 In James Mackovjak, vii.
31 State o f  Alaska, 533.
32 George Rogers, Alaska in Transition: the Southeast Region (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).
33 James Crutchfield, as quoted in Steve Colt.
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Figure 3: By 1948, the anti-fish trap rhetoric had gained a political foothold in 
Alaska. For statehood advocates, eliminating fish traps became a public necessity.
Source: “Fish Trap, Alaska’s Enemy No. 1,” 1948, Russ Dow papers, Archives and 
Special Collections, Consortium Library, University of Alaska Anchorage, UAA- 
hmc-0396-14o-f12-53.
Along with associating fish traps with outside business interests, statehood advocates saw 
the resource as being managed by an agency that did not have a vested interest in the success or 
failure of the industry, and that did not have to endure the economic hardships that resulted from 
poor management decisions. The future of the salmon industry, and the territory itself, was in the 
hands of transient, non-permanent policymakers.34
Therefore federal management was vilified. For instance, with the passage of the North 
American Fisheries Act in 1954, the tide of environmental policy shifted. Heralded as one of the 
first international fishery agreements, the United States, Canada, and Japan collaborated to develop 
a policy to protect property rights in their respective fisheries. By prohibiting Canada and Japan 
from fishing in Alaskan waters, pressure on Alaska’s salmon industry and the salmon themselves
34 See Peter A. Coates, The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Controversy: Technology, Conservation, and the Frontier 
(Cranbury: Associated University Presses, 1991), 38.
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was reduced significantly. While the biological and ecological impact of the act may have been 
minimal, given that salmon stocks do not respect political boundaries, the political implications 
were great. The United States had taken a step towards exclusivity of a resource on an international 
stage.35 While this particular exclusion had the potential to benefit Alaskans, it had the whiff of 
exclusivity that offended pro-Alaskan ideology.36
35 North Pacific Fisheries Act of 1954, Aug. 12, 1954, ch. 669, 68 Stat. 698 (16 U.S.C. 1021 et seq.).
36 Despite the seemingly unanimous dislike for fish traps, their advocates did not hesitate to defend their use. The 
late Ralph W. Johnson, professor of law at the University of Washington published a rebuttal to the anti-fish trap 
movement in 1964 titled “Regulation of commercial salmon fishermen: a case of confused objectives,” five years 
after their abolishment in Alaska. In this heavily referenced source, Johnson argued for the economic viability of fish 
traps, stating, “they make salmon catching absurdly easy and can be operated at 1/20 to 1/30 the boat-catching costs.” 
Johnson argued that commercial salmon fishing from a boat -  which he believed was “as obsolete as the buffalo 
hunter” -  as opposed to fish traps “makes economic sense as a temporary palliative for an unemployment problem; 
it makes economic nonsense as a permanent industry in a competitive society in a competitive world.” Johnson 
introduced fish traps as a solution to an economically vulnerable industry, and he may have been onto something. By 
removing the emotional distortion of cultural connotations Johnson found that fish traps were a potential solution to 
underlying problems inherent in current salmon management strategies.
Most important to the analysis of the economic viability of fish traps is a thorough understanding of the data from 
when fish traps were operational. Steve Colt’s study titled “Salmon Fish Traps in Alaska,” was the first thorough 
economic analysis of fish trap operations in Alaska in the mid twentieth century. Colt found that fish traps saved 
roughly $21.51 million in 2014 dollars per year, or about 12 percent of the ex-vessel value. While Colt found that from 
an economic standpoint fish traps were largely beneficial, he noted that an economic drawback was that there were 
significant startup costs for operation. Based on testimony collected by industry experts, the annual cost of installation 
varied from $4,000 to $40,000 per year per trap -  between roughly $34,500 and $355,000 in 2014 dollars according 
to the United States Bureau of Labor Statistics -  depending on location and whether the trap was fixed or floating 
(floating traps had a significantly smaller annual installation cost). Additionally, depreciation meant replacing about 
1/3 of the traps annually, and 2/3 of the traps every five years.
Another drawback was that participation in the fishery was limited to roughly 420 traps. Since fish trap success 
depends largely on precise positioning, and there are only a finite amount of optimal locations, per-trap production 
is greatly reduced as more traps enter the industry. Colt argued, “trap operation was very attractive when the new 
technology was first introduced, the best locations were used, and average yields exceeded 100,000 fish per trap,” but 
as more fish traps entered the industry, profits began to dwindle, and “only when the number of traps was reduced 
from the all-time high level of 799 (in 1927) to about 420 (throughout the 1930s and 1940s) did the traps show cost 
savings.” Despite the downsides, fish trap operation was largely successful as an economic endeavor. Once the initial 
investment was made, operation costs were marginal. Each trap required only a few attendants, and the operation of 
the trap required little effort.
Additionally, since the fish are stored in a live pen, fish trap operators were able to “smooth their flow of raw fish 
to the production lines during periods when the fisheries were closed for conservation or during natural swings in 
the run,” creating the possibility of a consistent income in a traditionally inconsistent industry. Colt’s study created a 
foundation for understanding the economic aspects of historical fish trap operations. But these economic advantages do 
not take into account a quota system like ITQs, which have the potential to accompany the fish trap model flawlessly. 
Colt saw an economic advantage to fish traps in that they were the closest things to an exclusive fishing zone given 
that boats were not allowed to operate within 300 feet of the trap. By eliminating competition in a given area, and 
partially dealing the problem of subtractability -  the perception by fishers that any fish not caught by them will be 
lost to another fisher -  fish traps were the first step towards what would be today considered progressive conservation 
ideologies. The problem of subtractability is discussed in the main text below.
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3.5 Statehood
The extent that federal management played in the decline of the salmon population in the 
1950s could not be demonstrated empirically, but as Gruening noted, “depletion was associated 
primarily in the minds of the fishermen with the existence of fish traps,”37 and fish traps became 
hugely symbolic. In fact, Alaska residents were so enraged by the fisheries issue that in 1955 when 
voting to ratify the constitution, more people voted to abolish fish traps than to ratify the constitu­
tion itself!38 And there is little doubt that Alaska’s constitutional delegates directly opposed federal 
mandates resembling vested rights to the resource by provisioning against “exclusive right or special 
privilege.” Open access harvest strategies were written into Alaska’s Constitution, and Ordinance 
number 3, which banned fish traps in Alaska, was passed, “as a matter of immediate public neces­
sity, to relieve economic distress among individual fishermen and those dependent upon them for 
a livelihood, to conserve the rapidly dwindling supply of salmon in Alaska, to insure fair compe­
tition among those engaged in commercial fishing, and to make manifest the will of the people 
of Alaska.”39 The establishment of local preference in the Alaska Constitution demonstrated the 
economic imperatives of the new state. Thus, with statehood, Alaska’s fishery management regime 
shifted to reflect Alaskans’ demand for ownership and control of the resource. Just as knowledge 
of salmon biology and ecology was advancing, Alaskans’ commitment to an open access resource 
hindered the implementation of sustainable practices, including the use of the efficient fish trap.
Where as federal managers understood that unlimited participation in the industry was not 
sustainable, Alaskans saw federal policies as nothing less than attempts to exclude residents from
37 Ibid, 392.
38 Ordinance number 3 read: “Shall Ordinance Number Three of the Alaska Constitutional Convention, prohibiting 
the use of fish traps for the taking of salmon for commercial purposes in the coastal waters of the State, be adopted?” 
and passed by a 10 to 1 margin: Ordinance Number 3, Alaska Constitution, and Vic Fischer, in James Mackovjak.
39 “The Constitution of the State of Alaska,” Ordinance No. 3.
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participating in the harvesting of a resource that they viewed as theirs.40 The solution, therefore, 
was to allow unlimited participation in Alaska’s salmon bounty with the assumption that Alaska’s 
commercial fishermen would not take more than their share. The new state explicitly declared the 
salmon resource an open access industry; Article VIII, Section 15, as adopted with statehood in 
1959 reads: “no exclusive right or special privilege of fishery shall be created or authorized in the 
natural waters of the State.”41 At last, Alaska was in control of its own resources.
However, by the end of the 1960s, the salmon populations were once again in dire straights 
with commercial harvest for all species dropping to around $100 million by the early 1970s, from 
its peak of $300 million only years earlier.42 The state’s solution was to alter the open access man­
date. In 1972, the Alaska Legislature amended Article VIII, Section 15 by adding a clarification to 
the original writing. The second sentence stated, “This section does not restrict the power of the 
State to limit entry into any fishery for purposes of resource conservation, to prevent economic 
distress among fishermen and those dependent upon them for a livelihood and to promote the ef­
ficient development of aquaculture in the State.”43 While the two statements “no exclusive right 
or special privilege shall be created or authorized in the natural waters of the State,” followed by 
the provision that the State can create exclusive right or special privilege by limiting entry “for the 
purposes of resource conservation.” could be interpreted as contradictory, they also represent the 
shifting political and economic needs of the state.44 Instead of contradicting open access, Section 
15 is better understood as an attempt to reconcile economic demands and ecological sustainability.
40 See Richard Cooley, Politics and Conservation: The Decline o f  the Alaska Salmon (New York: Harper & Row, 
1963), Ernest Gruening, The State o f  Alaska  (New York: Random House, 1968), George Rogers, Alaska in Transition: 
the Southeast Region (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).
41 Alaska Constitution.
42 See “Alaska Commercial Salmon Catches & Value 1878-2013 -  All Species Combined,” graph produced by the 
Alaska Department of Fish and Game.
43 Ibid.
44 “The Constitution of the State of Alaska,” Article 8, Section 15.
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These steps to mitigate the problems associated with an open access resource, however would prove 
temporary and the inherent problems associated with an open access industry continued.
3.6 Open Access and “Tragedy of the Commons”
Departing from the narrative momentarily, a closer look at how resource management ide­
ology has evolved helps explain why this resource is so difficult to manage. It was not until 1968 
that the problems associated with open access resources were given a name: “the tragedy of the 
commons.”45 Garrett Hardin, a human ecologist, wrote the foundational essay on resource exploita­
tion that identified fundamental flaws in open access land use ideologies and the resulting ecological 
consequences. In his telling, Hardin asked the reader to imagine a field -  a commons in England 
-  where farmers let their cows graze. This was sustainable if all the farmers allowed one cow to 
graze, but their rational self-interest prompted them to allow two cows to graze. Eventually, the 
commons was destroyed because the farmers saw the profitability of taking as much for themselves 
as they could or see it go to someone else. Hardin believed that this mentality is inherent in humans, 
and that one solution to the problem is to eliminate the commons. By creating private property 
the problems associated with the commons were averted. In other situations Hardin recommended 
coercion, or regulation, to discourage people from pursuing their immediate personal interests.46
Hardin’s thesis began a discussion that continues to this day. Scholars like anthropologist 
Katja Neves-Graga argue that the deterministic portrayal of human behavior conflates human be­
havior with capitalist incentives and does not take into account non-capitalist relationships with 
the natural world like native subsistence users.47 Even supporter Arthur F. McEvoy, author of The
45 Garrett Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162, no. 3859 (13 December, 1968).
46 Ibid.
47 Katja Neves-Graga, “Revisiting the Tragedy of the Commons: Ecological Dilemmas of Whale Watching in the 
Azores,” Human Organization 63, No. 3 (2004).
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Fishermen’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850-1980, was hesitant to 
accept Hardin’s argument without slight revision. Though McEvoy largely supported Hardin’s 
notion of tragedy of the commons to explain the current fisheries crisis, he veered away from as­
serting that selfish, individualistic behavior is inherent. “The competitive individualism that Hardin 
believed inevitably led to ‘the tragedy of the commons’ might not be a generic failing of the human 
species,” McEvoy argued, “but rather the specific historical consequences of the social changes that 
followed the advent of modern capitalist modes of production and social organization.”48 Despite 
the criticisms of Hardin and his controversial argument regarding human behavior, even his skeptics 
acknowledged that the open ocean is the ideal modern representation of the commons with all its 
attendant problems.
Scholars who study open access industries, specifically fisheries, point to the lack of defined 
property rights as a major cause for overfishing. Like the farmers in England sharing the commons, 
commercial fishermen on the open ocean aim to harvest as much as possible to maximize their own 
economic gain with little consideration of other users or the economic or ecological sustainability 
of their actions. To paraphrase McEvoy, this is not a fundamental human flaw, but the rational self­
interest essential to economic success in a capitalistic system. “Fisheries simply provide a labora­
tory example of the problem of environment because.in  most cases it is impossible to consign 
their husbandry to private owners as if they were cropland or stands of timber,” he noted.49 Elinor 
Ostrom, a Nobel laureate in economics, furthered the argument that “a basic problem leading to 
massive overfishing in the oceans is the lack of any property rights for the many commercially valu­
48 Arthur F. McEvoy, The Fishermen’s Problem: Ecology and Law in the California Fisheries, 1850-1980, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 12.
49 Ibid, 14.
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able species in the open ocean.”50 She asserted that the way to effectively manage common pool 
resources was to establish recognizable structures of property rights or ownership. Privatization, 
which could take on multiple forms and is not bound by Hardin’s notion of resource ownership, 
would avert degradation of the resource.51 This is not to say that individuals treat their own prop­
erty with more restraint. They merely would only have the right to harvest a smaller portion of the 
population, and without fear of someone else reaping the profit. Privatization would help prevent 
individuals from infringing on the development opportunities of others, Ostrom argued.
Though scholars understood that open access resources encouraged overharvesting by 
1968, there was still little consensus as to why. Hardin pointed to fundamental human behavior, but 
later scholars like McEvoy and Neves-Graga veered away from the oversimplified, deterministic 
explanation. Hardin identified the rational self-interest as predicated by capitalistic ambitions, but 
failed to identify the economic, social, cultural, and political complexity of resource extraction by 
simply assigning the negative consequences to inherent human behavior. He recognized a solution in 
privatization or regulation, but without contextualizing the complexities of an open access resource, 
his solutions did not provide a comprehensive framework for problems posed by the real world. 
The underlying problem of the commons was not inherent human behavior as Hardin believed, but 
a fundamental concept within the industry itself: subtractability.
In her 2005 book Understanding Institutional Diversity, Elinor Ostrom identified this under­
lying economic phenomenon that encouraged behaviors like hoarding and overharvesting; subrac- 
tability, according to Ostrom, “refers to the extent to which one individual’s use subtracts from the 
availability of a good or service for consumption by others.”52 Quite simply, if another’s behavior
50 Elinor Ostrom, “The Challenge of Common Pool Resources,” Environment 50, no. 4 (2008), 12.
51 Ibid.
52 Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
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affects one’s participation in a specific activity -  if someone else’s success negatively affects the 
success of another -  we are much more inclined to maximize our own profit to ensure our success, 
thus overharvest. Ostrom’s concept supports the established argument within the field that behavior 
resulting in the tragedy of the commons is not inherent human behavior, but a consequence of the 
social, political, and economic complexities of a capitalist system. If we think of subtractability in 
terms of a private resource, like timber on a plot of land, we can see the distinction. If each lumber 
company X is given a plot of timber to harvest, timber company Y’s activity on the next lot does 
not affect that company X’s ability to harvest lumber, thus eliminating the problem of subtractabil­
ity. However, if there are no property rights, and company X and Y are competing for lumber on 
a single hillside, both are much more inclined to overharvest because every tree that company X 
harvests will earn it more profit. To make the analogy similar to that of salmon fisheries, we must 
add the factor of indetermination. If company X and Y are competing for an indeterminate amount 
of trees, they harvest without reservation. Without assurance of the resource’s future viability, the 
compulsion to harvest is limitless, and overharvest is all but inevitable. In the current open access 
system, all the commercial fishermen are competing for an indeterminate amount of salmon, which 
only compounds the existing problem of subtractabiliy, resulting in a phenomenon called the “race
to fish.”53
The “race to fish” phenomenon was specifically referenced in an article published in The 
Economist titled “A Rising Tide: Scientists find proof that privatizing fishing stocks can avert 
disaster.”54 The article argued that under the current open access systems where total catch cannot 
be limited, “fishermen have an incentive to work harder and travel farther, which can lead to over­
53 A Rising Tide: Scientists find proof that privatizing fishing stocks can avert disaster,” The Economist (2008). http:// 
www.economist.com
54 Ibid.
72
fishing: a classic tragedy of the commons.”55 The ramifications of the race to fish are not limited to 
a simple tragedy of the commons dynamic, however. With a sudden rush of fishermen, fish stocks 
are subjected to a significant amount of pressure in a very short amount of time, spurred by the 
economic anxiety of an indeterminate resource. Concentrated stocks of economically desirable fish 
like halibut and salmon are harvested at unsustainable rates, and populations left fallow for the rest 
of the year. When fishermen return to the processors with a year’s worth of fish during a window 
lasting only a few short days, the market is saturated and the price value of individual fish is dimin­
ished. So, this race to fish, which is a direct consequence of an open access resource, proves both 
ecologically and economically damaging. Managers saw the consequences of this phenomenon in 
the Alaskan halibut fishery, and have recently adopted a quota system to avoid both the race to fish 
and associated economic consequences.56
Economist and University of Alaska Anchorage professor Steve Colt in his article for the 
Institute of Social and Economic Research titled “Salmon Fish Traps in Alaska” addressed a second 
inherent problem with open access industries: “the economic theory of open access resources makes 
a strong prediction that additional entry will occur whenever the average revenue product of output 
is positive for an individual.”57 This theory has been called the zero-profit hypothesis, and predicts 
that open-access industries have a zero-profit equilibrium. That is, when participation is open to 
all, individuals will continue to join when there is economic incentive. This results in participation
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid. Both of the current ITQ systems in Alaska were specifically referenced in the article as an example of the 
shortcomings of the previous systems, and the promise of the new quota-based fishery: “The Alaskan halibut and king 
crab fisheries illustrate how ITQs can change behavior. Fishing in these waters had turned into a race so intense that the 
season had shrunk to just two to three frantic days. Overfishing was common. And when the catch was landed, prices 
plummeted because the market was flooded. Serious injury and death became so frequent in the king crab fishery that 
it turned into one of America’s most dangerous professions...
After a decade of using ITQs in the halibut fishery, the average fishing season now lasts for eight months. The number 
of search-and-rescue missions that are launched is down by more than 70% and deaths by 15%. And fish can be sold 
at the most lucrative time of year—and fresh, so that they fetch a better price.”
57 Steve Colt.
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to the point where there is a zero profit margin. Once the fishery becomes saturated, fishermen are 
forced to leave the industry, so as to “maintain a constant average economic profit level of zero.”58 
Thus, open access industries are not just harmful to the resource itself, but to the economic stability 
of the resource. Alaska salmon fishermen have managed to avoid the zero profit equilibrium, not 
because of the effectiveness of the open access ideology itself, but because of rising real prices. 
“The periodic need to exit the industry has been minimized, but only by luck,” Colt explains.59 In 
short, rising real prices have delayed the inevitable consequences associated with the zero-profit 
equilibrium, including the loss of jobs resulting from an oversaturation of the industry. The un­
avoidable truth is that to develop a biologically and ecologically sustainable commercial salmon 
harvest, Alaskans must solve the underlying problems of subtractability, the race to fish, and the 
zero-profit equilibrium inherent in an open access resource -  a task well beyond eliminating a few 
lines of the Constitution.
3.7 Quotas and the Elimination of the Commons
The current system of limited entry in Alaska simply controls the number of fishermen 
who can participate in a fishery, but does not restrict the number of fish they can harvest. Managers 
can only limit the catching potential of the commercial fleet, not the catch itself. In the words of 
Ralph W. Johnson, “everyone has his chance, if he promises to fish with one hand tied behind his 
back.”60 Proponents of a limited entry system like Johnson, saw a limitation of participants in the 
industry as a way to reinvigorate the salmon population. “The real answer” to the fisheries question,
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid, 30.
60 Ralph W. Johnson, “Regulation of commercial salmon fishermen: a case of confused objectives,” Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly 55, no. 4 (October 1964), 141.
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Johnson argued, “lies in limiting the number of fishermen.”61 Given the information available to 
Johnson, this was a step in the right direction, but would later prove ineffective as a long-term solu­
tion. While the limited entry system had immediate benefits -  as Johnson predicted: “All would, in 
fact, be assured of an increased income within a very short time...” -  the long-term consequences 
would not be dissimilar from a completely open access fishery. Even limited entry results in a race 
to fish.62 Thus, because both Ostrom’s notion of subtractability and Colt’s zero-profit hypothesis 
have not been addressed, Alaska’s current limited entry system is not economically or ecologi­
cally sustainable. Since only the number of fishermen can be limited and not the total catch, the 
problem of subtractability still encourages the incentive to race to fish. The only difference is that 
there are fewer boats competing. Over the course of the limited entry system the few participants 
spend more money on gear to increase their catch rates. Limited competition means more fish to 
share among participating boats, so more capital can be invested in gear and personnel, increasing 
overall efficiency.
The idea that each fisherman is competing with every other for an indeterminate amount of 
salmon encourages a race to fish -  just like in an open access system -  and the same inclination to 
overharvest. Also like the open access system we encounter Colt’s zero-profit hypothesis; instead 
of the number of fishermen resulting in a zero-profit equilibrium, it is the dramatically increased 
cost-per-vessel that drives the system. With the economic consequences of subtractability, the race 
to fish, and a zero-profit equilibrium come long-term ecological consequences, many of which 
Alaska is currently experiencing.
Not surprisingly, the state of Alaska faced another salmon crisis in the early 2010s, which
61 Ibid.
62 “A Rising Tide: Scientists find proof that privatizing fishing stocks can avert disaster.”
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yielded such dismal Chinook salmon runs in the Yukon, Kuskokwim and Cook Inlet drainages that 
the federal government allocated $20.8 million in disaster relief funds at the request of governor, 
Sean Parnell. Much of the disaster relief funds went directly Yukon River and Cook Inlet region 
fishermen received much of the relief funds to “compensate them for losses incurred from the Chi­
nook Salmon Disaster during 2012.”63 Even as management strategies have adjusted, it remains 
clear that the future of salmon fishing in Alaska rests on the ability of managers and fishermen to 
balance economic needs against what is ecological sustainable.
3.8 Conclusion
Analyzing scientific and technological developments alongside the political, economic, and 
cultural tensions surrounding the salmon industry shows how natural resources like salmon are 
affected by political, cultural, and economic desires as much as biological and ecological science. 
Fish traps serve as the primary example of how both federal and state managers interpreted and 
implemented economic and political demands with respect to biological and ecological limitations. 
Federal managers, who were supportive of the industry as a whole and encouraged participation by 
outside interests, created opportunities for fish traps, and sought to reconcile large-scale economic 
demands. The territory of Alaska, on the other hand, was concerned with local participation and 
profits, and their management and legislative decisions reflected that. While federal and territorial 
objectives differed in scope, both were practicing the management principle of balancing economic 
opportunity against ecological realities.
63 “$7.8 Million in Fishery Disaster Funding Set to Arrive in Alaska,” Press Release from the Office of Congressman 
Don Young (AK), 15 August, 2014. www.donyoung.house.gov
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Chapter 4 Possible Solutions for a Sustainable Industry
4.1 Introduction
Fishery managers and scientists today are faced with pressures similar to those faced by 
federal managers in Alaska during the early 20th century. Management regimes reflect what is politi­
cally desirable as much as what is biologically and ecologically possible. The challenge of fishery 
management is not only staying current with the developing biological, ecological, and technical 
understanding, but acceptance in society as well. This chapter explores contemporary issues within 
the industry with a focus on modern fisheries management, possible solutions to what remains an 
erratic industry, and challenges specific to Alaska.
4.2 Fishery Management in an Oil Economy
Alaska statehood ushered in significant shifts in salmon research and management, expedited 
by the development of the Alaska petroleum industry. A decade after Alaska was ratified as the 
49th state in the union, the state stumbled upon the greatest economic opportunity in Alaska his­
tory. Oil fields on the North Slope became the economic backbone of the new state, and the Alaska 
“oil economy” was born.1 The new oil economy had far reaching effects on all aspects of Alaska’s 
economic development. Between the years 1969 and 1987, the Alaska oil industry had profits ex­
ceeding $42.6 billion.2 Prominent Alaska historian Claus-M. Naske observed that “petroleum ha[d] 
driven Alaska’s economic growth since 1970, and oil revenues ha[d] paid most of the government’s 
general expenses and supported thousands of public and private sector jobs since the late 1970s.”3
1 Claus-M. Naske, Alaska: A  History, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2011), 349.
2 Ibid, 353.
3 Ibid, 352.
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Additionally, many of these funds were allocated to state-sponsored research endeavors, including 
the newly established Alaska Department of Fish and Game (ADF&G).
The discovery of oil proved a fortuitous turn of events for the young state. After a decades- 
long battle attempting to establish Alaskan economic autonomy, oil provided the opportunity for 
Alaska to operate with much less federal influence. Consequently, salmon research, which had 
traditionally been funded by the federal government, could be managed exclusively by ADF&G. 
Where Alaska had once relied on the private sector to provide a majority of salmon research funds, 
the oil industry allowed Alaska to move away from industry-specific pursuits.
The oil industry also had indirect consequences on the Alaska salmon industry. With the de­
velopment of a new oil economy, the attention of the general public was directed North. Oil provided 
a temporary reprieve from an over-dependence on Alaska’s salmon resource. Consequently, less 
pressure was placed on the development of the salmon fishery, and salmon populations rebounded. 
The prosperity of the salmon industry continued until the oil recession of 1998-1999.
By December of 1998, oil had plummeted in per-barrel value, and prices were the lowest on 
record since tracking began in 1949. In 2000, Alaska reported a fiscal deficit of about $1.1 billion 
and major oil companies were forced to downsize operations. Simultaneously, the salmon industry 
was affected by decreased population numbers, reduced demand by Asian markets, and competi­
tion from the far-cheaper farm-raised salmon. The recessions in both the oil and salmon industries 
resulted Alaska’s increased demand on natural resource extraction to cover its losses. For the next 
few years, the salmon industry was marked by booms and busts, but the consequences of the oil 
recession on the Alaska salmon industry became manifest a decade later, prompting Governor Sean 
Parnell to turn to the federal government for disaster relief funds.4
4 Ibid, 376 .
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4.3 Alaska Salmon Disaster
The salmon industry has undoubtedly shaped Alaska’s political culture and economy, and 
commercial fishing has become a cultural venture as well as an economic one. Harvesting salmon 
from a seiner symbolizes what it means to be Alaskan -  independent and rugged - and participat­
ing in Alaska’s longest lasting natural resource industry is a point of pride. Economically, salmon 
fishing remains an important contributor to the state economy. In 2013 alone, the Alaskan salmon 
industry harvested more than 220 million fish with a total value nearing $900 million.5 According to 
StatsAmerica, a service of Indiana Business Research Center at Indiana University’s Kelley School 
of Business, commercial salmon fishing accounts for 38% of Alaska’s cumulative fishing, hunting, 
and trapping exports.6 At first glance it appears that business was booming, but statistics can be 
misleading. When the total catch was broken down by species, the data shows that of the more than 
220 million salmon harvested in 2013, about 300,000 were Chinook salmon with a value of less 
than $10 million.7 These shockingly low numbers were due to both significantly reduced population 
numbers and strict closures on the Chinook salmon fishery. Chinook salmon populations have been 
so low in recent years that they have been declared a disaster by the United States federal govern­
ment and $20.8 million in disaster relief funds were slated for the 2014 fiscal year. This story is not 
new and certainly not unique. As the history of Alaska salmon industry demonstrated, population 
fluctuations are endemic. The Alaska salmon industry is the picture of a boom-and-bust enterprise, 
and often this economic cycle is accompanied by ecological and biological degradation; economic
5 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, “Alaska Commercial Salmon Catches & Value 1878-2013, All Species 
Combined.” http://www.adfg.alaska.gov
6 “USA States in Profile: Alaska,” StatsAmerica (Bloomington: Indiana University Kelley School of Business) 
last updated 18 March, 2015. www.statsamerica.org. Alaska is ranked number 1 in fishing, hunting and trapping 
exports with a 2014 value of 2,365,556,655, 45.9% of the state’s total North American Industrial Classification System 
(NAICS) exports.
7 Alaska Department of Fish and Game, “Alaska Commercial Chinook Salmon Catches & Value 1878-2013.” http:// 
www.adfg.alaska.gov
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booms mean more fishermen, more gear, and more opportunity at the expense of the biological 
and ecological communities. During the periods of naturally low population numbers, the heaving 
fishing pressure during productive years exacerbates the problems of an already stressed popula­
tion. Attempts have been made to relieve the industrial stress placed on the resource by limiting 
participation and gear type by legislation, but the long-term consequences are not dissimilar from 
an unregulated resource.
In this era of heightened ecological awareness and booming technological capabilities, the 
development of a sustainable industry is feasible, if not expected. In an interesting twist, a viable 
solution to the modern salmon crisis in Alaska could be to go back to technology that was banned 
more than fifty years ago: fish traps. But resolving the modern fisheries dilemma would require 
marked changes in not only legislation, but also how Alaska’s commercial fishermen understand 
their relationship to the salmon resource. Common use must be revisited with a special eye to con­
temporary understandings of open access resource development and surrounding problems.
The history of Alaska’s salmon fishery shows all too clearly the consequences of an open 
access resource. The scholarship of Elinor Ostrom and Steve Colt points to specific shortcomings 
in accepted ideologies. Now, just like in the late 1960s, and the 1950s before that, Alaskans must 
find a solution to the salmon question that transcends biological, ecological, and economic interests.
To begin, moving beyond the simple problems associated with the commons, subtractability 
and the zero-profit equilibrium must be taken into consideration. Analysis of the problem will show 
that adoption of an Individual Transferrable Quota (ITQ) and the implementation of a system using 
industrial salmon fish traps could be a solution that is ecologically, biologically, and economically 
sustainable. The ITQ has gained favor in the fisheries community; it eliminates the open access 
ideology by assigning property rights to a portion of the fishery. In one fell swoop subtractability
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and the zero-profit equilibrium are eliminated.
Since entry into a specific fishery is limited, and participants are given quotas that they are 
not to exceed, fishermen no longer compete with one another. Quite simply, one fisherman harvest­
ing his quota has no affect on another fisherman harvesting his. Suddenly, there is no longer an 
economic incentive to outcompete other fishermen, and no longer a race to fish. Rather, it is in the 
fisherman’s best interest to harvest his quota with as little cost to him as possible and at times when 
fish have the highest value, which addresses the zero-profit equilibrium and encourages a consistent 
supply of fish to assure the highest quality and highest price-per-fish. With the elimination of inter­
vessel competition for the resource, and the desire to fill the quota at as little cost as possible, the 
economic equilibrium is profitable and the problem of overfishing mitigated.
Furthermore, ITQs open other economic sectors to the fishing industry. Since quotas can 
be leased, sold, or transferred, the dealings in quotas can be as economically lucrative as the har­
vest itself. These programs have succeeded in Australia’s lobster fishery, Alaska’s crab fisheries, 
and more recently in the Alaska halibut fishery. The transferrable quota system empowers local 
participants and develops a stronger local connection to the resource. No longer are fishermen the 
only participants in the industry.
Despite the promise of ITQs and the economic and ecological benefits of adopting them, 
the current boat-based salmon harvest poses complex problems involving feasibility and imple­
mentation, specifically in establishing realistic, pre-season quotas. Case studies of successful ITQ 
systems in Alaska are the halibut and crab fisheries, but unlike those species, salmon spawn only 
once, so overharvesting a single run has compounded effects. This semelparity results in signifi­
cantly greater salmon population abundance fluctuations than in iteroparous species, such as halibut 
and crab. Thus, establishing quotas on the basis of maximum sustained yield as mandated by the
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Alaska Constitution is much more complicated. A strong surge of salmon could indicate a strong 
run, but it could also indicate a weak run arriving earlier than usual. In short, it is all but impossible 
for managers to assign realistic harvest quotas before they receive initial harvest data indicating 
the strength of the run.
Furthermore, given the wide marine migration patterns of salmon, there is no way to establish 
drainage-specific selective harvest methods, which would be essential in maintaining the fishery 
during drainage-specific population concerns. For instance, given that the Yukon, Kuskokwim, and 
Cook Inlet drainages are experiencing dangerously low Chinook salmon population abundances, 
it would be in the managers’ best interest to relieve the pressure of commercial fishermen on the 
threatened stocks. However, boat-based capture methods such as seining make any sort of species- 
specific harvest impossible. Despite assigning quotas to the fishermen that would appear conserva­
tive, if a large portion of the harvested fish is from a low-density stock the consequences could be 
severe. So even if managers could issue pre-season quotas to commercial fishermen, they would 
not be able to account for which stock was being harvested. Where a relatively strong Chinook run 
may allow for higher quotas, threatened runs would allow for small quotas -  perhaps no quotas 
would be issued altogether.
4.4 A New Management Regime
Though political and economic roadblocks would make implementing an ITQ incredibly 
difficult, a comprehensive solution may involve going back to a capture method banned after Alaska 
statehood in 1959. Fish traps could answer a number of questions posed by salmon managers and 
the commercial salmon industry. By establishing fixed traps in strategically selected locations, the 
Alaska salmon industry would be able to effectively implement an ITQ system and, for the first
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time, implement a management system that is completely economically and ecologically sustainable.
Like current ITQ systems, the trading of quotas in the commercial salmon fishery could 
introduce diverse economic opportunity in areas that traditionally depended heavily on commercial 
fishing. The advantages of localizing economies for both environmental and ecological sustainability 
are gaining a foothold in the global environmental economic discussion. Just as Ernest Gruening 
advocated for the localization of the Alaska salmon industry believing that local participation would 
strengthen the resource, Frank Alcock, assistant professor of political science at New College of 
Florida and director of the Marine Policy Institute at Mote Marine Laboratory, argued empower­
ing local participation would be both environmentally and economically beneficial.8 By giving 
local preference in the commercial salmon industry, and developing comprehensive legislation 
to prohibit a big-business takeover, introducing fish traps and an ITQ system would allow for a 
developed, complex rural economy that could participate in global trade. An alternative would be 
a Community Fishing Quota (CFQ) depending on the number of participants or investors per fish 
trap. CFQs would resemble a cooperative or community program where the community as a whole 
would own the quota, which could then be left intact or divvied up among individual community 
members. Empowering local economies would in turn strengthen regional and national economies 
while simultaneously promoting sustainable harvest.
The ecological benefits would not be limited to the indirect benefits of promoting greater 
stewardship through the empowerment of local economies. Direct ecological benefits of a fish trap 
based salmon fishery are substantial. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health re­
ported that between the years 2000 and 2009, the average annual number of commercial fishermen 
participating in the Alaska commercial salmon fishery was more than 34,000, creating a commercial
8 Frank Alcock, “Sustainable Trade Begins at Home,” World Policy Institute (2008), 54.
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fleet of staggering proportions. The sheer number of fishing vessels has environmental consequences, 
one of the most obvious being the burning of fossil fuels. In his 1964 article, Ralph Johnson stated 
that in the year 1963 there were more than 30,000 United States and Canadian commercial fishermen 
participating in the Alaska salmon fishery -  not much different than the 31,300 in 2014 according 
to United States Bureau of Labor Statistics -  and that with fish traps “roughly 27,000 of them were 
unnecessary; they could have stayed on shore without any reduction in the total catch and with a 
distinct improvement in the management of the resource.”9 Based on Johnson’s figures, fish trap 
operation could harvest the same amount of fish as 27,000 commercial salmon fishing vessels using 
only the fuel required for the boats needed to empty the trap’s live pens.10
Not only would fish traps significantly reduce the carbon footprint of the salmon fishing 
industry, they would reduce the ecological footprint as well. Because fish traps are fixed -  regardless 
of whether they are designated a fixed or floating trap -  there is minimal ecological disturbance. 
Since fishermen compete with other marine species like whales, seals, and sharks for salmon, fish­
ing vessels often come into direct contact with them. Aside from the by-catch of seine boats, the 
boat activity negatively affects the behavior of marine predators. When discussing the ecological 
consequences of whale watching in the Azores, Katja Neves-Gra9 a pointed out that “often whale- 
watching boats produce too much underwater disturbance (noise), leaving the whales disoriented.
9 Ralph W. Johnson “Regulation of commercial salmon fishermen: a case of confused objectives,” Pacific Northwest 
Quarterly 55, no. 4, (October 1964).
10 An equally important issue that the elimination of those 27,000 fishermen would address is fatal and nonfatal 
injuries associated with commercial fishing. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Institute 
of Occupational Safety and Health produced a report titled “Fatal Occupational Injuries in the U.S. Commercial Fish­
ing Industry: Risk Factors and Recommendations, Alaska Region” (http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/2011-103/pdfs/ 
ak cfid summary ev.pdf) reporting that between the years 2000-2009 there were 39 fatalities associated with the 
Alaska salmon fishery. The institute reported Full-Time Equivalents (FTEs) in the Alaska salmon industry was 34,287 
with an annual fatality rate of 115 per 100,000 FTEs between the years 2000-2009. Non-fatal injuries are difficult to 
estimate because statistics are not available for self-employed fishermen, and according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
statistics represents roughly 50 percent of commercial fishermen. For more information regarding the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, see “Facts of the catch: occupational injuries, illnesses, and fatalities to fishing workers, 2003-2009.” 
http://www.bls.gov/
84
this can potentially affect their social lives, their capability to feed themselves, or their ability to 
nurture their offspring. Some argue that such stresses can actually compromise the ecological re­
silience of whales and that, as such, whale watching might have serious negative impacts on the 
long-term welfare of the species.”11 Though she was discussing the ecological impact of whale 
watching specifically, commercial salmon fishing produces similar ecological consequences; both 
industries place themselves in close proximity to marine predators, both produce significant noise, 
and the commercial salmon fleet has the added stress of competing with the marine life for the salmon 
resource. Fish traps would eliminate such disturbances and would occupy water unfit for whales. 
The direct ecological benefits of fish traps in nearly eliminating the carbon and ecological footprint 
of the commercial salmon industry would compound the tremendous ecological and biological 
benefits of effective management and regulation. Additionally, effective management in the new 
system would bolster economic development and encourage the sustainable growth of the industry.
Transitioning to an ITQ or CFQ system would mean an ideological shift in the role of 
salmon management; an already dynamic strategy would have to include the ability to forecast 
salmon population abundances at a heightened level of precision -and farther in advance -  than is 
possible with technology currently available. While a quota system would have significant benefits, 
the limitations -  as discussed previously in the complexity of establishing realistic quotas -  are 
undeniable. However, the difficulty of managing such a dynamic resource would be mitigated by 
the use of fish traps. Not only would salmon managers be better informed as to real-time population 
information gathered from fish traps using state of the art equipment, but they would be able to 
establish realistic quotas, better protect threatened species of salmon from overharvest, and more
11 31,300 fishermen in 2014 reported by U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. www.bls.gov. Neves-Graga, Katja,“Revisiting 
the Tragedy of the Commons: Ecological Dilemmas of Whale Watching in the Azores,” Human Organization 63, 
No. 3 (2004), 290.
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efficiently regulate participants in the industry.
Fish traps employ a holding pen where the salmon gather and are kept alive until they are 
loaded onto a tender. The ability to keep captured salmon alive for a period of time makes dynamic 
management strategies possible like never before. In the current system of management, initial 
population estimates are based largely on the commercial harvest. In fact, the only way to verify 
population run size is to count in-river escapement, which means that the salmon have already 
navigated the gauntlet of nets and are no longer harvestable. Unfortunately, with commercial fish­
ing vessels there is little opportunity to determine the size of the harvest until the fish have been 
killed.12 By using live pens, managers could collect the same data without threatening the entire 
run, mitigating the risk of ambitious harvest rates before proper information has been gathered. 
State of the art DIDSON imaging sonar could be installed on each trap to provide precise, real-time 
information regarding the number of fish in each trap. DIDSON sonar produces video-quality sonar 
readings that are so precise they can determine fish length.13 That information could be shared with 
managers throughout the state instantaneously and allow them to develop more precise population 
data at a high level of efficiency. Based on the information provided to the managers, they could 
determine the strength of the run before a single salmon is harvested. Based on initial numbers, 
they could then designate a quota that would ensure sustainable escapement.
Live holding pens have more than one management benefit. If at any time managers find 
that population numbers have taken a turn for the worse, they could immediately disseminate a 
closure in which the fish currently being held in traps would be released immediately. To imple­
12 Commercial harvests are not necessarily indicative of the size of the salmon run. For example, a large initial catch 
could indicate a large run, or an average run that has arrived early. Initial population estimates usually come with a 
wide margin or error, and they can only be verified in river, at which point it is too late for commercial harvest.
13 “DIDSON,” Echoview, (2014). http://www.echoview.com
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ment such a system harvest would have to be highly organized. For example, there would be a 
precise date and time when each trap was allowed to harvest the salmon being held in the pens. 
Once managers were satisfied that a sustainable population had been established, they would al­
low traps to harvest their catch. These harvest dates would be scheduled pre-season in increments 
that allowed for population estimates, while also accounting for the need to harvest the salmon to 
prevent overcrowding in the pens.
In order to ensure that the salmon run is harvested proportionally -  that is, ensuring that 
not only early fish are harvested, for example -  fish traps could have openings. Towards the end of 
the federal government’s salmon management in Alaska, United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
Director John L. Farley proposed limiting fish trap operation to certain times of day ensuring pro­
portional abundance. A similar system could be adopted under a quota system with fish traps. Such 
a regulation would be easy to implement. It would only require operators to close the openings into 
the first hearts so that the salmon simply swam around. The ease of closure would mean they could 
be quickly and efficiently implemented.
Once a particular trap’s quota had been met, the trap itself would simply cease operation for 
the season. The opening to the first heart would be closed, the anchors pulled, and the trap dragged 
to its overwintering site. Given the limited number of fish traps and the real time data provided to 
managers, quota information would be immediately available. Managers could use the sonar counts 
to determine precisely the number of fish in the trap at any given time, the precise number of fish 
harvested, and, with additional sonar installed on the exit gate, the precise number of fish released.
Fish traps would not only offer great management benefits. Commercial fishermen would 
also benefit from the new system. Selective harvest would be a saving grace for participants of 
the salmon fishery during times of species-specific closures. In recent years, with Chinook salmon
87
populations in the Yukon, Kuskokwim, and Cook Inlet dwindling, commercial harvest of other 
perfectly viable populations have been limited. A specific example is the closure of the Cook Inlet 
sockeye commercial fishery to prevent the by-catch of the threatened Chinook salmon. Commercial 
fishermen hoping to take advantage of the booming sockeye population could only watch as more 
than an estimated 1 million sockeye salmon made their way past commercial fishermen and up the 
river systems of Cook Inlet.14 It was the inability of seiners to selectively harvest that prohibited 
participation in the perfectly healthy sockeye salmon fishery.
Fish traps would allow for such selective harvest, thus enable commercial fishermen to con­
tinue operation despite species-specific closures. Since the salmon are held alive in the fish traps, 
fishermen could realistically isolate the desired species and allow the threated species to swim free. 
Size-specific exclusion devices could be installed on each trap that would lead to different holding 
pens. During the early part of the salmon season, generally only four of the five species start head­
ing to the rivers: sockeye, pink, chum, and Chinook. Chinook salmon are typically significantly 
larger than the other species and could thus easily be separated from the sockeye, chum, and pink 
salmon. Given the demand and the economic advantage of being able to quickly separate desirable 
and undesirable species, the technology would develop quickly.
Compared with the current commercial salmon fishery, enforcement of fish trap regulation 
would be remarkably straightforward. Instead of monitoring tens of thousands of commercial fishing 
vessels, policing heavily competitive salmon openings, and chasing down renegade fishermen, law 
enforcement would have to check in on a small number of stationary fishing sites. Even during site 
visits, law enforcement officials would only have to ensure that the gear was legal, all the monitor­
14 Rashah McChesney, “King salmon restrictions affect Cook Inlet sockeye management,” Peninsula Clarion, as 
reprinted in Alaska Journal o f  Commerce (18 July 2014).
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ing equipment was operating properly, and the each trap had the appropriate documentation. The 
data regarding number of fish per trap, number of fish harvested, the trap’s operational status, and 
other relevant data associated with the harvest of salmon would all be digitally monitored from 
a central location. With such vast advances in communication technology and digital sharing, all 
information essential to ensuring traps were harvesting according to established protocol would 
be available to managers and enforcement officers. If a trap’s information was not reporting to the 
central location, it would be the responsibility of law enforcement officers in the area to check the 
site and ensure that the regulations -  including relevant closures or openings -  were being obeyed. 
The use of fish traps in Alaska’s commercial salmon fishery would greatly reduce the number of 
law enforcement officers necessary to monitor participation in the industry.
In addition to law enforcement, each trap could have a resident state employee whose job 
is to monitor trap operations. Like Alaska Department of Fish and Game officials who accompany 
crab-fishing boats in the Bering Sea to ensure proper harvest, such employees could be stationed 
on some or all of the operational traps. The presence of these officials would not just alleviate the 
pressure of law enforcement officers, but could act as the liaison between commercial fishermen and 
managers. While managers monitoring the population data from a centralized location are effective 
and efficient, it is also important to have a representative on site. The Alaska Department of Fish and 
Game technicians stationed on the traps would also serve a scientific purpose. Age-sex-length data, 
as well as any other scientifically necessary samples, could easily be collected from the harvested 
salmon. Thus, in addition to the enforcement and management advantages to fish traps of having a 
technician stationed there, there are scientific advantages as well. The most exciting aspect of fish 
trap implementation, however, would be the possibility for scientific and technological innovation 
within the field of fisheries and in the commercial fishing industry.
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The promise of a transition to fish traps in Alaska’s commercial salmon fishery is the possibil­
ity of technological innovation spurred by the inherent economic nature of an ITQ or CFQ system. 
When compared to current open access or limited entry systems, both ITQs and CFQs create an 
economic incentive for efficiency. As discussed previously, Alaska’s current system of limited entry 
does not address the problem of the zero-profit equilibrium. That is, instead of the number of vessels 
inevitably leading to a zero-profit industry, the investment of capital per vessel would result in the 
same economic phenomenon. By creating economic incentive to be as efficient and inexpensive 
as possible in an ITQ or CFQ system, there is little doubt that participants in the fish trap industry 
would develop new technology that would be economically beneficial, and in turn ecologically 
beneficial. To use an example from above, if DIDSON imaging sonar were implemented into each 
trap -  a method of sonar currently used by fisheries managers to count the in-river escapement of 
salmon -  extremely accurate population data would be available instantaneously. This would enable 
managers to create more realistic harvest quotas that would allow for the greatest economic gain 
while simultaneously ensuring the strength of salmon runs. Furthermore, the implementation of 
exclusion devises would allow commercial fishermen to participate in the fishery despite species- 
specific restrictions. The economic incentive for continued participation in the industry would 
certainly create a demand for technology that enabled them to do so. Technology that is available 
today would be a platform for a rush of technological innovation within the fisheries industry.
The potential for technological innovation that is both ecologically and economically ben­
eficial is difficult to envision or quantify. There are no solid examples from when fish traps were 
previously employed. Because fish traps in the early- to mid-twentieth century did not operate under 
a quota system -  the system was actually quite similar to the current limited entry system, where 
only the number of participants was limited, not the amount of fish they could catch -hardly any
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technological advances that would fall under the criteria of ecologically and economically beneficial 
were used. Nevertheless, a transition to an ITQ or CFQ commercial salmon fishery in combination 
with the current technological climate would result in vast technological improvements in the com­
mercial salmon fishery that could be economically and ecologically beneficial.
Despite the countless advantages to implementing an ITQ system along with fish traps into 
the Alaska commercial salmon fishery, substantial legislative and cultural hurtles would have to be 
overcome. Specifically, Ordinance No. 3 -  the ordinance preventing the operation of fish traps in 
Alaskan waters -  would have to be repealed. This alone would be a daunting challenge given the 
climate surrounding Alaska’s salmon fishery. By repealing Ordinance No. 3, legislators would be 
opening the floodgates of opposition. Commercial fishermen would fiercely oppose the privatization 
of what is promised as a common use resource in the Alaska Constitution.15 As seen in the tumultuous 
history of the Alaska salmon industry, interest groups often dig deep trenches and create a political 
stalemate. Joe Sullivan, a partner at Mundt MacGregor, a Seattle-based law firm, articulated the 
dilemma: “the public.. .sometimes resists the privatization of a public resource and if government 
gets too involved in the details of the privatization (rather than leaving it to the fishermen to work 
out), it can end up politically messy.”16 These processes, according to Sullivan are often slow and 
could take from 5-15 years to come into effect. The fact that there are currently newly adopted ITQ 
systems in Alaska shows that a transition to a system based on fishery-privatization is not out of 
the question, however, partially because, as Sullivan notes, “evidence that ITQs work is a power­
ful new hook to capture the political will and public attention needed to spread an idea that could
15 Article VIII, Section 3 of the Alaska Constitution reads: “Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wildlife, 
and waters are reserved to the people for common use.”
16 As quoted in “A Rising Tide: Scientists find proof that privatizing fishing stocks can avert disaster,” The Economist, 
(2008). http://www.economist.com
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avert an ecological disaster.” 17
While there are, in fact, quota systems currently in effect in Alaska -  halibut and crab -Alaska 
does not actually have jurisdiction in the waters where the majority of these fisheries occur. Outside 
of three miles off Alaska’s coast, the state is no longer allowed to declare a resource as “common 
use,” because the fishermen are in international waters. Instead, United States territorial waters 
are managed according to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act -  an 
act named in part for the late U.S. Senator from Alaska, Ted Stevens. This act gives the United 
States Department of Commerce sole control over exclusive economic zones. Thus, management 
authority for fisheries such as groundfish (cod, rockfish, etc.) and halibut is directly under federal 
control.18 For example, the Western Alaska Community Development Quota “allocates a percent­
age of all Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands quotas for groundfish, prohibited species, halibut, and 
crab to eligible communities” in order to promote economic development and community partici­
pation in the fishery; a program implemented by the U.S. Department of Commerce.19 However, 
the Magnuson-Stevens Act stipulates that salmon are explicitly exempt from federal management. 
Instead, the jurisdiction falls squarely on the state.20 Therefore, fish traps and ITQs involving the 
commercial salmon fishery would exclusively take place in Alaskan waters, thus falling under the 
jurisdiction of the Alaska Constitution. Therefore,, to implement the quota system in the salmon 
fishery, the Alaska legislature would have to address Article VIII, Section 3.
17 Ibid.
18 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Findings, Purposes, and Policies,” Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management A ct Section 2, (May 2007), 13. http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/msa2005/docs/MSA amended msa%20
20070112 FINAL.pdf
19 “Community Development Quota (CDQ) Program,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National 
Marine Fisheries Service, Alaska Regional Office. http://www.alaskafisheries .noaa.gov
20 U.S. Department of Commerce, “North Pacific Fisheries Conservation,” Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management A ct Section 313, 104-297, 109-479(a) (May 2007), 134. http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/msa2005/docs/ 
MSA amended msa%20 20070112 FINAL.pdf
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4.5 Limitations to Quotas and Fish Traps
Transitioning to fish traps instead of continuing with the current boat-based commercial 
fishery would produce cultural ramifications as well. There is something to be said for what Ralph 
W. Johnson somewhat facetiously dubbed “the time-honored tradition of their forefathers . . ”21 
Commercial fishing in Alaska is embedded in coastal culture, and to suggest removing most, if not 
all of the commercial fishing vessels from the fishery, would create passionate pushback. Regard­
less of the validity and soundness of arguments regarding the economic, ecological, and biological 
benefits to the transition, suggesting that more than 30,000 people participating in the industry 
completely alter their way of life, is radical in terms of top-down economic reorganization in the 
United States. Thousands of fishermen would have to abandon their boats and reinvest in fish traps.
However, steps could be taken to smooth the transition. Local and state governments could 
explore options for transitional subsidies so that fishermen who have invested in a boat could af- 
fordably transition to fish traps. These funds could come directly from the state itself or through 
federal programs. For instance, when the federal government committed to sending disaster relief 
funds to mitigate the economic impact of poor Chinook salmon runs in the Yukon, Kuskokwim, 
and Cook Inlet drainages, there were no specific instructions as to how the $20.8M should be spent. 
NOAA Fisheries Alaska Regional Administrator Jim Balsiger stated that the only stipulation to 
the disbursement of funds was that they be used for activities that “restore the fishery or prevent 
a similar failure in the future, and to assist a fishing community affected by such failure.”22 The 
best way to fulfill this vague stipulation and develop a comprehensive economic, ecological, and 
biological program is to adopt an ITQ management system that uses fish traps as the harvesting
21 Ralph W. Johnson, 141.
22 Julie Speegle, “Alaska Salmon Fisheries to Receive Nearly $21M in Fishery Disaster Relief Funds,” NOAA 
Fisheries News Release (26 February 2014). http://alaskafisheries.noaa.gov
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mechanism. Thus, a portion of the $20.8M could be used to subsidize individual fishermen and 
communities to ease the transition.
Still, boat fishing would be the preferred method of capture in some circumstances. For 
instance, in areas like Prince William Sound where pink salmon are returning to hundreds of small 
streams that feed into the sound, fish traps would not be as effective as commercial fishermen who 
can pinpoint pockets of pink salmon and harvest them. Fish traps are more suited for large estuarine 
environments where a large number of fish follow similar migration routes to a precise location, 
like the mouth of the Yukon, Kuskokwim, or other major river systems -  precisely where a majority 
of the salmon crises occur. Therefore, a region-specific implementation of fish traps with ITQs or 
CFQs would be most effective. Regardless of the particular adaptation, the commercial fishery would 
still need to address the problem of subtractability and the zero-profit equilibrium while simultane­
ously encouraging local participation to promote the development of a sustainable local economy.
By empowering local participants and developing a commercial salmon industry that is not 
only economically sustainable, but ecologically and biologically, Alaska would be at the forefront 
of salmon fishery innovation. Demonstrating the effectiveness of such progressive policies would 
serve as a beacon for other nations that participate in the commercial salmon industry. Establishing 
the economic and ecological viability of such a program would encourage similar shifts in manage­
ment ideologies and foster an international industry standard. Such a standard would open the doors 
to policies and scientific advancement unlike anything before.
Today, fish traps evoke significantly less emotional reactions from many Alaskans -  certainly 
less than the nearly unanimous disdain for them in the 1950s. Unlike in the 1950s, adjectives like 
“murderous,” “iniquitous,” or “the very embodiment of evil in this world,” resonate much less
94
with current Alaska residents -  many of whom have no knowledge of the historic debate. Today, 
terms prefixed with “eco” carry much more significant cultural connotations, and the fish trap’s ef­
ficiency -  both economic and ecological -  might be seen as anything but brutal. Political aspirants 
would certainly not be able to “resort to taking a staunch stand against traps and count on the other 
issues being drowned out by ringing app lause .” as George Rogers observed was effective in the 
196 0 23 In the current climate fish traps do not carry the same negative connotations and have the 
potential to be seen for what they are: tools to achieve economic and ecological efficiency. The 
paradox of the fish trap and ITQ system is that its simplicity is perfectly suited for the complexi­
ties of the industry today. In an increasingly competitive and innovative world, fish traps offer the 
possibility of growth and profitability.
Nevertheless, the greatest hurdle to implementing a quota system and reintroducing fish 
traps to Alaska would be the huge cultural impact on the existing Alaska commercial salmon fishery. 
Cultural investment in the resource has come in the form of capital and also the fishing heritage. 
Not only have commercial fishermen in Alaska invested large amounts of capital into their fishing 
vessels and equipment, but those participating in the industry are often descendants of fishermen 
who likely fished the same waters. To ask commercial fishermen to give up the way of life they 
and their forefathers have practiced for centuries would not only be asking them to forfeit their 
investments as far as capital, but also their fishing heritage. For this reason, the implementation of 
such a system should not be taken lightly.
However, this illustrates the theme presented throughout this thesis: the importance of con­
sidering political, economic, and cultural imperatives along with biological and ecological ones. 
Whereas the biological and ecological benefits of implementing such a system are clear, we cannot
23 George Rogers, Alaska in Transition: the Southeast Region (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1960).
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impose a regime that discounts the complexity of a resource or those who participate in its extrac­
tion. Humans are as much a part of the ecosystem as salmon, and to ignore the cultural implications 
of management decisions would not be fulfilling the goals of a fishery manager.
4.6 Conclusion
Alaskans have reached a vital crossroads in the history of the salmon industry. They can 
choose to ignore the established record of current salmon fishery system, think of another pallia­
tive such as limited entry to delay the inevitable, and ultimately cripple the economic viability of 
the industry, Or, they can reinvent themselves. With a history of adaptability handed down from 
industries past, Alaskans have the power to redesign, reimagine, and ultimately reshape the future 
of the Alaska salmon industry. They have the power to address the underlying problems of subtrac­
tability and the zero-profit equilibrium, and, by fostering technological innovation and conservation 
practices, the development of an economically and environmentally sustainable industry is possible.
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Conclusion
Alaska’s fishery managers have the near impossible task of reconciling economic opportunity 
with ecological sustainability. Starting in the early twentieth century, economic demands placed on 
the resource often influenced policy decisions as much biological and ecological science. Political 
and cultural imperatives further complicated this balancing act.
The first era of federal management demonstrated how fishery managers, using hatcheries 
and predator control, operated according to the belief that producing salmon on an industrial scale 
would circumvent the need to manage wild stocks. Although escapement-based management had 
been implemented with an escapement goal of 50 percent of the total run, the lack of technological 
precision and the inability to accurately estimate population abundances meant early attempts at 
escape-based management were more of an art than a science. In many cases, as with the Rogue 
River in Oregon, attempts to manage salmon fisheries often resulted in the complete forfeiture of 
economic opportunity. Thus, the inability to accurately predict population abundances meant that 
management in the early twentieth century was often unable to reconcile economic demand with 
ecological realities. Despite their best efforts, managers did not have the tools to sustain both.
A shift in fisheries management began when E.S. Russell formulated the first biomass 
equation in 1931. Fishery scientists now had a way to abstractly quantify natural phenomena, and 
ecology and biology played a more substantial role in policy decisions. Still, political, economic, 
and cultural imperatives remained influential. For example, by the mid-twentieth century, the pres­
ence of fish traps in Alaska waters, the majority of which were owned by outside interests, came 
to symbolize all that was wrong with federal management. Because of the economic benefits fish 
traps provided their owners, many Alaskans felt left out. Fish traps not only represented exploita­
tion by outside interests, but the exclusion of Alaskans from participating in the Alaska salmon
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industry. Regulations that prohibited commercial fishing operations within 300 feet of fish traps 
created exclusive economic zones, and Alaskans watched as brailers hauled hundreds of thousands 
of fish that would directly benefit their absentee owners.
Roadblocks to modern theories and practices further demonstrate how political, economic, 
and cultural imperatives remain present in fishery management decisions. Alaska defined open ac­
cess and common use in the Constitution, which favored local participation in the resource. While 
the policies were based on what decision-makers saw as the best way to reconcile economic op­
portunity with ecological necessity, they were also reactionary. Anti-fish trap fervor had reached the 
point where open access and common use were a cultural requisite in Alaska. The main difference 
between state and federal management strategies was scope. Federal managers aimed to reconcile 
macro-economic opportunity with ecological realities, while state managers aimed to reconcile 
local- and regional-economic opportunity with ecological sustainability. It is clear that both man­
agement goals contained inherent contradictions that have yet to be reconciled.
This thesis has provided specific examples of various aspects of fishery management while 
simultaneously demonstrating how strategies changed over time. Hatcheries and predator fish eradi­
cation offered an analysis of economic imperatives. Escapement-based management demonstrated 
the struggle to incorporate ecological fragility into management decisions. Fish traps during the 
transition to Alaska statehood illustrated the power of political and cultural imperatives in fishery 
management decision-making. Analysis of each of those factors in the context of developing tech­
nology, advances in biological and ecological understanding, and fishery modeling techniques, 
highlights the complexity of fishery management decisions.
All these factors shed light on the Alaska salmon crisis today as managers continue to strike 
a balance between economic and environmental goals on the one hand, and political mandates and
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cultural expectations on the other. Reimagining the Alaska salmon industry as a quota-based fishery, 
or a return to fish traps, would be a fairly radical departure from current management strategies. But 
that would not be unique in the history of Alaska’s salmon fisheries. Each era of management was 
a departure from the one before it as managers adjusted to new knowledge and changing demands. 
There is little doubt, however, that to implement a new management strategy, Alaskans would have 
to embrace an ideological shift that puts ecological sustainability on equal footing with economic 
needs.
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